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insufficiently “neutral” towards users or third parties that interact with the
platform. For example, Google faces a formal FTC investigation based on
allegations that it has tinkered with search results rather than presenting users with
a “neutral” result. Twitter faces a formal investigation after the social media
service restricted the ways in which third party developers could interact with
Twitter through its application programming interface (“API”).
These
investigations represent a new attempt to shift the network neutrality debate to
higher-level Internet platforms. Rather than focusing on providing basic Internet
access neutrally, these novel neutrality claims look to platforms that are built upon
the Internet, and seek to ensure that they, too, behave “neutrally.” Unfortunately,
network neutrality principles do not transition well from Internet service providers
to search engines and social media sites. Ultimately, the network neutrality debate
serves as a poor tool for scrutiny of higher-level Internet platforms. This Article
demonstrates that network neutrality cannot be applied to higher-level Internet
platforms and then examines another possible method of analyzing novel neutrality
claims using antitrust law.
It re-frames novel neutrality claims as tying
arrangements, the subject of extensive antitrust law and scholarship. In applying
tying doctrine to novel neutrality claims, this Article demonstrates that it, too, is
insufficient for examining novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms. The Article
closes by proposing a different analysis to examine these novel neutrality claims, an
analysis based on Justice O’Connor’s attempt to reform tying doctrine.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s Internet, the most important players are not manufacturers, designers,
or programmers, but platforms. The big names in the Internet and computing—
Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft—all offer more than a product or set of
products. They offer an environment in which users operate, a starting point for
them to interact, work, network, and be entertained.1 These platforms build upon the
infrastructure of the Internet. For example, Google began as a search engine but
now offers a group of websites, each of which links prominently to the others and
provides a different service to users including maps, e-mail, a social networking
service, a photo-sharing service, and dozens of others. It also offers a mobile
environment through its Android operating system. Even Facebook is not simply a
social-networking website but a platform upon which users can play games, share
photos, and engage in a number of other social activities. Countless other websites
and services allow users to post their activity to Facebook (or tweet it on Twitter).
For example, a user of the social check-in service Foursquare has the option of
1
See Hanno F. Kaiser, Are “Closed Systems” an Antitrust Problem, 7 COMP. POL’Y INT’L
91, 99-101 (2011). According to Nokia CEO Stephen Elop:

The battle of devices has now become a war of ecosystems, where ecosystems include
not only the hardware and software of the device, but developers, applications,
ecommerce, advertising, search, social applications, location-based services, unified
communications and many other things. Our competitors aren’t taking our market
share with devices; they are taking our market share with an entire ecosystem. This
means we’re going to have to decide how we either build, catalyze or join an
ecosystem.
Id. (quoting Elop in an e-mail).
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posting a check-in to their Facebook wall. Similarly, a user of DailyFeats, a social
media site for cataloguing daily accomplishments, has the option of posting their
feats to Facebook.2 These platforms interact with each other and at times blur the
lines between them.3
The next chapter in the story of competition and innovation on the Internet will
rely on these platforms. Many Internet platforms have recently faced criticism, legal
complaints, and formal investigations for being insufficiently “neutral.” The
network neutrality debate has expanded. Neutrality advocates are no longer focused
simply on physical gatekeepers to the Internet, but want to ensure that platforms that
are built upon the Internet infrastructure themselves behave neutrally. This has
resulted in a number of novel neutralities, some of which have become widely
known. This article focuses on three such neutralities: search neutrality; API
neutrality; and online marketplace neutrality. Generally, these novel neutrality
claims seek to require platforms to treat all users and platform applications the same,
without blocking or tolling some subset of disfavored applications, users, or uses.
This policy debate and the manner in which Internet platforms’ relationships with
each other and their users are scrutinized by the FTC and other enforcement agencies
may radically influence how Internet platforms grow, innovate, and compete—in
positive or negative ways. This Article considers two methods that the FTC or other
enforcers may use to scrutinize violations of neutrality principles by Internet
platforms, one based on network neutrality rules, and the other based on antitrust
law. The Article demonstrates that neither of these methods is reasonable for
analyzing the behavior of Internet platforms, and instead proposes a different
method, loosely based on Justice O’Connor’s proposed reforms to tying doctrine.4
A vital area in which public policy may constrain Internet platforms is in how
they interact with other platforms, services, and applications. Some platforms may
choose to be very open and neutral towards applications built upon and services
using the platform, others may wish to stop third-party uses of the platform, or limit
interactions with the platform. Based on these different platform policies, Internetbased platforms face claims that they must behave neutrally towards applications or
platform users. Importantly, these neutrality claims are not limited to scholars and
commentators—instead, major Internet platforms including Google, Twitter, and
Apple have faced recent investigations or threats of investigation by the FTC or
another antitrust or telecommunications enforcement agencies. These investigations,
spanning several forms of neutrality, raise the possibility of widespread scrutiny of
Internet platforms that could radically influence the development of the Internet
landscape. This paper considers the methods by which scrutiny of Internet platforms
should proceed in order to identify harmful arrangements without penalizing
competitive behavior.
2

DAILY FEATS, www.dailyfeats.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).

3

Users of the program Tweet deck, for example, might see and respond to items from
several social media sites without distinguishing one from another. See Jaymar Cabebe,
HootSuite, TweetDeck, or Seesmic?, THE DOWNLOAD BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011, 4:43 PM),
http://download.cnet.com/8301-2007_4-20088869-12/hootsuite-tweetdeck-or-seesmic/ (“For
Android users, there are basically three apps to choose from when it comes to one-stop social
networking: HootSuite, TweetDeck, and Seesmic.”).
4

See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J.
concurring).
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For the most part, when platforms run afoul of neutrality principles, it is because
they have discriminated between platform applications in a way that limits the ways
in which the platform can be used. Oftentimes, a platform will want to give access
to some applications but not others, or give some applications access on more
favorable terms. For example, iTunes screens apps before granting them access to
the exclusive marketplace for iOS devices and iTunes, and imposes terms on
products that filter some products out of the iTunes market. This discrimination
between applications, giving access to some but not others, has raised an alarm in
some quarters.5 Some commentators have advocated expansion of network
neutrality principles to these higher-level Internet platforms6—a platform that is not
open equally to all is a violation of neutrality principles that some argue must be
legally addressed.7 Others have proposed scrutinizing discriminatory platform
actions under the antitrust laws.
We know a great deal about how platforms behave. Economists have examined
situations in which it is efficient and pro-competitive for platforms to allow open
access or to discriminate between potential platform applications, and when platform
owners are likely to make an anticompetitive choice to open or close platforms.
Unfortunately, the two frameworks that are likely candidates for analysis of novel
neutrality claims aimed at Internet platforms are out of touch with developed
economic principles. If applied to these Internet-based platforms, network neutrality
rules will achieve nonsensical and harmful results, and antitrust scrutiny of
discriminatory platform actions as tying arrangements would impose a quasi-per se
rule forcing platforms open without adequate evidence that a closed platform is
harmful.
This Article applies these two methodologies to three examples of Internet
platforms that discriminate in some way against platform applications: search
neutrality; API neutrality; and online marketplace neutrality. I propose amendments
to these frameworks to bring them into line with current economic understanding of
platform behavior. Specifically, I propose the adoption of a rule similar to Justice
O’Connor’s proposed alterations to the Court’s tying doctrine, beginning with an
analysis that considers the market position of the platform and considers the likely
effects of discriminatory action towards platform applications. Part II examines our
current knowledge of the economics of platforms. Parts III and IV examine network
neutrality and antitrust frameworks and the attempts to apply these frameworks to
fears that Internet platforms are insufficiently neutral in their interactions with
platform applications. Part V applies each framework to three Internet platforms that
have faced novel neutrality claims, demonstrating that neither the network neutrality
nor the antitrust framework are suitable methods for scrutinizing the ways in which
Internet-based platforms may discriminate against applications. Part VI concludes
by proposing a reasonable way to engage in scrutiny of novel neutrality claims.

5

See infra Section V.d, considering neutrality claims directed at online marketplaces.

6

I refer the Internet platforms discussed here as “higher-level” Internet platforms because
they are not directly tied to any single physical connection that allows individuals to connect
to the Internet, rather, they are built upon the diffuse platform that is the Internet.
7

See infra Section V, examining efforts to apply neutrality principles to three Internet
platforms.
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II. ECONOMICS OF PLATFORMS
Over the past several decades, there has been a great deal of scholarship on the
economics of platform behavior. Though there are ongoing debates about how
platforms, especially Internet platforms function, there are areas of general
consensus. This section identifies a small number of generally accepted principles
regarding how platforms behave and when they may have negative effects on
competition. The following Sections demonstrate that the likely methods for
analyzing novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms are not in line with the
economic realities of platform behavior.
The first generally accepted principle is that neither an open platform nor a
closed one is inherently more efficient or better for competition than the other.
Some level of discrimination may be optimal for competition, the competitors, and
consumers. Whether it is better for the platform owner to open or close their
platform, or whether either option can harm the competitive process is specific to the
situation.
Platform owners may face legitimate incentives to select an open or closed
platform policy.8 Neutrality claims generally seek to require platforms to be more
open and not to discriminate between potential platform applications. But some
closed platforms achieve desirable results through discrimination. At times, careful
discrimination in allowing access to the platform may be necessary to successful
market competition. Professors Joseph Farrell and Philip Weiser identify a number
of well-known situations where platforms achieve desirable results by remaining
closed. For example, an innovative and rapidly evolving platform may wish to have
greater control over platform applications in order to ensure that applications keep
pace with the innovative platform as it competes with other platforms.9 Similarly if
a platform exerts control over a small number of available applications, rather than
allowing a large competitive applications market to flourish, consumers may be
assured that applications will work well with the platform, and may face smaller
search costs in selecting applications.10 Similarly, distinguishing between high and
low quality applications may be a particular problem for consumers in a totally open
platform—a problem that may cause consumers to lose confidence in the platform
after exposure to a few low-quality applications. Lack of control over platform
applications was the downfall of the Atari gaming system which faced a deluge of
low-quality games from many game designers—the game market was diluted and
consumers became disenchanted with the platform after experiences with lowquality games. This encouraged competition from other, more tightly controlled
systems, like the Nintendo, with its own set of games available only on the
Nintendo, which Atari could not offer on its system.11 As a result, later gaming
8

See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 97 (2003).
9

See id. at 99.

10

Id.; see also Kaiser, supra note 1, at 99-101. This is the route taken by Apple, which
imposes specific requirements on apps’ access to the platform. See App Store Review
Guidelines, APPLE, http://developer.apple.com/appstore/guidelines.html (last visited Aug. 24,
2011).
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systems have maintained different levels of tighter control over their applications
markets.12 Following this model, Apple screens the apps that are available on
iPhones and iPads, barring, among others, apps that add little or nothing to the user
experience.13 One justification for this limitation could be to make it easier for users
to find quality apps—and this is consistent with Apple’s general (and oft-criticized)
“walled garden” philosophy, where it offers a more curated group of applications.14
There are good reasons for some platforms to limit application access. But on
the other hand, by allowing vigorous competition in an applications market, an open
platform can ensure that a wide range of applications will be available to consumers
as cheaply as possible.15 According to Farrell and Weiser, platform owners can
generally be relied upon to select a degree of openness that will allow the platform to
provide the most value to consumers. They call this concept “internalizing
complementary efficiencies,” or ICE:
“[I]n choosing how to license interface information, certify
complementors, and otherwise deal with developers, . . . a firm has a clear
incentive to choose the pattern that will best provide it or its customers
with applications. . . . [T]he unintegrated platform monopolist has an

11

See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 607 (2003) (“By not affording Atari an intellectual property right to play
Nintendo games on its console, the court encouraged rivals to build up their own systems,
which Sega, Sony, and Microsoft later did successfully.”).
12
A current example of platforms facing a similar problem can be found in competition
between mobile operating systems. Google’s Android allows any designer to create apps that
function on the operating system. See ANDROID MARKET, http://market.android.com (last
visited Nov. 15, 2011). Apple requires apps to be approved before they are available to
consumers in the App Store.
See App Store Review Guidelines, APPLE,
http://developer.apple.com/appstore/guidelines.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (“The app
approval process is in place to ensure that applications are reliable, perform as expected, and
are free of explicit and offensive material. We review every app on the App Store based on a
set of technical, content, and design criteria.”). While Apple faces criticism that it is
insufficiently open to allow for innovative apps, it has hedged against the risk that consumers
will lose confidence in the platform due to low-quality or harmful apps. In fact, Android, but
not iOS, has been occasionally plagued by malicious apps that do harm consumers or their
devices. See Android Market a Breeding Ground for Malicious Mobile Apps, SECURITY WEEK
(Aug. 12, 2010), https://www.securityweek.com/android-market-breeding-ground-maliciousmobile-apps.
13

See Apple removes $1,000 featureless iPhone application, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008
(stating Apple removed an app called ‘I Am Rich’ that cost the maximum allowed price of
$999.99 and did almost nothing).
14

Notably, though Apple is heavily criticized for its controlled approach, more apps are
available for iOS than for Android, though there are more free apps on Android. See Shocker!
Free Android apps outnumber free iPhone apps, ENGAGET (Apr. 28, 2011, 10:04 PM),
http://www.engadget.com/2011/04/28/shocker-free-android-apps-outnumber-free-iphoneapps/.
15

See Kaiser, supra note 1, at 101.
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incentive to favor whichever form of organization of applications is most
efficient (or delivers the most value to users).”16
There are well-known exceptions to ICE—if we could simply rely on a platform to
always make the most efficient decision as to whether to open their platform to
outside developers or not, there would be no need for neutrality principles or
antitrust scrutiny to push for either an open framework or a closed one. The most
notable of these well-known exceptions where a platform owner may not select the
value-maximizing option are: when the platform price is regulated; when the
platform owner fears platform competition from application developers; when the
platform owner fears losing the option of returning to a closed platform; and when
complementarity is incomplete between the platform and the applications, the
platform owner may keep the platform closed in order to occupy a greater portion of
the applications market.17
A second area of general consensus is that market power is a necessary condition
for competitive harm to stem from a platform’s decision to close, to remain closed,
or to discriminate between platform applications. Antitrust law has incorporated this
general agreement into its standards.18 The reasons behind it are clear. Without
market power, a platform owner that has a closed or discriminatory policy towards
platform applications will simply drive blocked applications to competing platforms.
To the extent that these applications benefit consumers, the competing platforms will
gain an advantage. Though limits on applications may force applications out of the
market or raise barriers to their entry, a single platform in a competitive platform
market cannot alone cause such effects.19
Though market power is necessary for a platform to cause competitive harm in
an applications market, it is generally recognized that a platform with market power
deciding to move towards a more closed platform model or discriminating against
some applications is not necessarily anticompetitive. As discussed above, there are
many efficient, pro-competitive reasons for a platform to close or restrict the market
for platform applications—for example to maintain a rapid pace of innovation for an
innovating platform, to maintain quality control or security among applications, or to
lower consumer search costs. In some situations, a platform, even one with market
power, may be less attractive to consumers if it is open and non-discriminatory.
Though market power is not sufficient to demonstrate an anticompetitive effect,
such an effect is possible when a platform with market power chooses to close or to
discriminate against applications.20 Generally, these anticompetitive effects will take
16
Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 101-02 (“That is, a firm will internalize
complementary efficiencies arising from applications created by others.”).
17

See id. at 105-19.

18

See Kaiser, supra note 1, at 104 (“Without significant market power and the threat of a
high level of market foreclosure, there is no basis for imposing antitrust liability on a platform
sponsor’s ‘intra-platform legislation.’”).
19
See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 401 (2009) (emphasizing the appropriateness of a
market power requirement in analyzing tying arrangements).
20
See generally id. at 400. Professor Elhauge identifies five harms that may stem from
tying arrangements, most relevant here is that “tying can impair tied rival competitiveness in
ways that increase tied product prices and profits.” Id.
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two forms—foreclosing existing market competitors from a market that is then
overall less competitive; and excluding would-be competitors from a market,
keeping that market at some lower level of competition.
The basic model demonstrating that a monopolist has no incentive to tie in an
inefficient way (Farrell and Weiser’s “obvious ICE”21) only holds when the two
goods are generally consumed together. But if, for example, there is a second
market in which the platform application is useful, the platform with market power
may favor one set of applications for its platform, in order to give the favored
applications an edge in this other market. Specifically, a disfavored application
could be foreclosed from this market or excluded from attempting to enter it by
virtue of its exclusion from the platform with market power. For example, if some
of the same video game titles are available for mobile device platforms (for example
Android, iOS, and Blackberry) and home gaming systems (for example Wii,
Playstation, and Xbox), one mobile platform with market power might exclude a set
of games from its platform in order to allow favored games to benefit in the related
home gaming market.22 The harm that occurs here is the foreclosure of existing
firms not simply from the platform, but from the gaming market. They could, for
example, lose the opportunity to gain positive feedback and buzz between the mobile
and home gaming markets—in some instances availability on multiple platforms
might be important for marketing, or for added functionality. In this situation, the
platform’s exclusivity could also have exclusionary effects on potential video game
designers, if joining the discriminatory platform is vital to enter the video game
market, then platform exclusivity or discrimination will raise barriers to entering the
applications (video game) market generally.
Though some platform discrimination may cause exclusion and foreclosure in
other markets, it may also have the pro-competitive effects described above,
allowing the platform to better compete and be more efficient. Anticompetitive
effects must be considered against the pro-competitive effects of a more controlled
platform that increase the overall value of the platform to consumers and increase
consumption of the final product. Competitive gains or the necessity of
discrimination to successful competition may offset the limitations that the platform
could cause in applications markets. In some cases, the platform’s core business
may not be possible without some application discrimination.23
In summary: neither an open nor a closed platform is necessarily more efficient
and both can be positive forms of competition; market power is necessary for a
discriminatory platform to cause competitive harm, but it is not sufficient to
demonstrate such harm; and the harms to competition that are likely to be caused by
platforms non-neutral behavior are foreclosure and exclusion from related markets
that are then less competitive. Though much of antitrust law is generally in line with
these areas of economic agreement,24 the two most often promoted methods for
21

Id. at 101.

22

See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837
(1990); see also Elhauge, supra note 19, at 401.
23
This could be true of Internet search, where the very product offered is a list of relevant
results to a search term. Discrimination based on usefulness is what users want and expect of
a search engine.
24
See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 128 (“Substantively, the Justice Department’s
case against Microsoft relied on the potential competition exception to ICE. The DOJ
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analyzing novel neutrality claims of Internet-based platforms are far out of touch
with them. Network neutrality principles, especially those enshrined in the FCC’s
Network Neutrality Order, either prohibit too much pro-competitive conduct or are
simply nonsensical when applied to higher-level Internet platforms. Antitrust’s
tying doctrine comes closer to an appropriate standard, yet is imperfect because it
imposes per se illegality on a number of platform activities that have strong procompetitive effects. Parts III and IV examine each of these frameworks before Part
V applies them to a set of Internet platforms facing neutrality claims to demonstrate
the deficiencies of each of these frameworks.
III. BACKGROUND: THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND ATTEMPTS TO APPLY
NETWORK NEUTRALITY TO INTERNET-BASED PLATFORMS
Network neutrality is a simple idea: that Internet gatekeepers should not
discriminate between Internet users or applications based on their intended use of the
network. Instead, advocates argue, the Internet should be neutral as to the use to
which it is put. An extensive debate has defined the bounds of this simple principle,
and has considered whether it should be enforceable by some body of law. Recently,
that debate has expanded in scope.
The Internet is a communications platform, but it is also a platform upon which
platforms are built. Network neutrality debates to date have focused on the lowest
level of the Internet infrastructure—access to the Internet itself, not the platforms
built upon it. Identified violations of the net-neutrality principle have tended to
block, slow, or toll specific uses of the Internet. The legal rules that have developed
to analyze these simple violations may be applied in a relatively straightforward
way. Recently, however, the terms and principles of the network neutrality debate
have been applied not just to access to the Internet, but also to higher-level platforms
built upon it. Application of these principles, described below, to higher-level
Internet platforms creates problems and questions that are difficult to answer within
the network neutrality debate. Without careful consideration of how network
neutrality problems should apply to higher-level Internet platforms, policy results
will be nonsensical and potentially harmful.
A. Rules and Cases Establishing and Testing the Bounds of Network Neutrality
Network neutrality law has rapidly evolved over the past several years—though
there is no consensus that this evolution has resulted in a better regulatory
environment. Since December of 2010, both traditional fixed and mobile broadband
Internet providers have been governed by the Federal Communications Commission
under its Report and Order “Preserving the Open Internet.”25 The FCC Order sets
out three general principles that it will enforce: 1) transparency; 2) no blocking; and
3) no unreasonable discrimination.26 Transparency requires broadband providers to
developed evidence that Microsoft itself and others in the industry viewed the development of
strong independent ‘middleware’ as a threat to Microsoft’s monopoly in operating systems.”).
25

Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (Dec. 21, 2010). These network
neutrality rules have recently faced an unsuccessful legislative challenge. See Cecilia Kang,
Senate Votes Against Net Neutrality Killer, Post Tech (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/senate-votes-against-net-neutralitykiller/2011/11/10/gIQAdScC9M_blog.html.
26

Id. at ¶ 1.
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disclose “network management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and
conditions . . . .”27 The “no blocking” principle prohibits fixed broadband providers
from blocking “lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices.”28
“No blocking” is applied less stringently to mobile broadband providers who may
block applications, services, or devices, but may not block “lawful websites, or . . .
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services.”29 The “no
unreasonable discrimination” principle applies equally to fixed and mobile
broadband providers and prohibits discrimination in “transmitting lawful network
traffic.”30 This principle prohibits providers from disfavoring some sites in ways
that fall short of blocking them. For example, a broadband provider could not slow
down disfavored sites, or offer favored sites, applications, or services (or those that
are willing to pay for it) premium services. Each of these prohibitive principles is
tempered by an allowance for “reasonable network management.”31 The order
allows broadband providers to take reasonable steps to “(1) reduce or mitigate the
effects of congestion . . . ; (2) address traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful;
(3) prevent the transfer of unlawful content; or (4) prevent the unlawful transfer of
content.”32 The Order establishes that network management justifications will be
balanced against its neutrality principles.33
These rules and principles are generally in line with the vision of net neutrality
that the FCC has espoused in net neutrality challenges leading up to the Order. In an
early precursor to the FCC Net-Neutrality Order, the agency investigated Madison
River Communications, a regional provider of voice and DSL service, for blocking
its customers from using voice-over-IP services such as Skype.34 The FCC and the
company reached a consent decree in which Madison River agreed to pay $15,000
and to stop blocking VOIP services.35 Though the Madison River investigation
occurred five years prior to the Net-Neutrality Order, it is squarely one of the types
of behavior that the FCC seeks to curb. Madison River blocked a specific Internet
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. The Order explicitly gives more leeway to wireless broadband providers than to
fixed providers because mobile broadband “is at an earlier stage in its development than fixed
broadband and is evolving rapidly.” Id. at ¶ 8. The no-blocking restrictions that the order
establishes for wireless providers appear to allow them to continue controlling the devices that
may be used on their networks and the specific types of services, but if they offer web service,
they may not selectively block some disfavored websites. Id. This is in line with the FCC’s
arguments in Madison River Communications where it challenged (and ultimately entered a
consent decree with) a regional wireless provider that blocked Voice-over-IP services that
competed with its own voice services. See In re Madison River Communications, 20 F.C.C.R.
4295 (2005).
30

Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, at ¶ 1.

31

Id.

32

Id. at ¶ 81.

33

Id.

34

See In re Madison River Communications, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).

35

Id.
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application, an action that today would violate the no-blocking provision.36 Though
mobile broadband providers have more leeway to block than fixed providers, they
may not block applications that compete with their voice or telephony services as
VOIP does for a mobile phone network.37
Madison River was a small company that was engaging in a violation of
network-neutrality principles that was relatively small and at the time was novel.
The FCC instituted a much larger case against a major player just a few years later.
In Comcast v. FCC, the FCC identified and challenged another violation of the
principles that it would later enshrine in the Report and Order. The FCC challenged
Comcast’s decision to interfere with Internet traffic related to the peer-to-peer file
sharing service Bittorrent.38 Following a formal investigation, the FCC found that
Comcast “significantly impeded consumers’ ability to access the content and use the
applications of their choice.”39 Comcast changed its network management practices
to comply with FCC policy, but subsequently challenged the FCC’s authority to
order it to change its network management under the Communications Act of 1934,
which allows the FCC to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations,
and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”40
The FCC based its order on this ancillary authority in the absence of any direct grant
of authority to order Internet service providers to alter their network management
practices.41 The D.C. Circuit held that the congressional policy statements on which
the FCC relied to support its authority were insufficient to grant ancillary jurisdiction
over Comcast in the case.42
36

Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, ¶ 88:

We make clear that, for the singling out of any specific application for blocking or
degradation based on harm to the network to be a reasonable network management
practice, a broadband provider should be prepared to provide a substantive
explanation for concluding that the particular traffic is harmful to the network, such as
traffic that constitutes a denial-of-service attack on specific network infrastructure
elements or exploits a particular security vulnerability.
Further, Madison River sought to block VOIP services because they were in competition with
its voice services. Blocking of competing services receives special attention in the rules.
Wireless broadband providers receive more leeway than fixed providers, but they are
specifically prohibited from blocking competing services. Id.
37

See id.

38

See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm, 600 F.3d 642, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Cecilia Kang, Court Rules for Comcast over FCC in ‘net neutrality’ case, WASH. POST. (Apr.
7,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040600742.html. Bittorrent is notable for highvolume Internet usage. See BitTorrent, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
39
In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, at 13,054 (2008).
40

47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006).

41

See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646.

42
Id. at 661. Such authority requires the Commission “to tie its . . . ancillary authority . . .
to . . . ‘statutorily mandated responsibility’ . . . .” Id. By finding this mandate absent, the
Court vacated the FCCs order.
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The FCC’s loss in Comcast led directly to the Net-Neutrality Order in which it
simultaneously attempts to establish net-neutrality principles as clear-cut rules, and
its authority to engage in such rulemaking. The long-term fate of the Order is yet
unclear.43 The FCC takes pains to establish its jurisdiction in ways that are different
from those that the D.C. Circuit rejected in Comcast. Rather than relying on
ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC claims direct authority to implement net-neutrality
rules under its statutory grant of authority to “encourage the deployment on a
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans . . . .”44
The FCC justifies the substance of its Network Neutrality Order as necessary to
protect “innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth, competition, and
free expression.”45 In addition to these general goals, the FCC Report announcing
the Order identifies several more specific harms that it believes will occur in the
absence of net-neutrality enforcement. For example, the Report argues that
broadband providers will limit free and open access to the Internet in harmful ways
and that they have already began to do so.46 The Report and Order portrays a level
of certainty regarding the likely outcome of an absence of net-neutrality regulation
that is belied by the economic and legal literature. There is significant debate as to
whether innovation and Internet openness would decline in the absence of the net
neutrality order.
B. Economic Views of Network Neutrality
The FCC Net Neutrality Report and Order give the impression that economic
scholarship is clearly in favor of the type of regulation that the FCC seeks to impose.
But there is a great deal of disagreement. Some economists argue that net neutrality
is necessary, others argue that the innovation and competition that the FCC seeks to
protect is best served without net neutrality regulation.
One group of commentators generally concludes that though network neutrality
principles may be good, rules enforcing those principles are unnecessary. A leading
voice in this group is Professor Christopher Yoo. Yoo considers network neutrality
principles in the context of the chain of production between creators of Internet
43

There have been challenges to the FCC Order’s basis in the legislature and in courts.
Shortly after the Order was approved by the FCC and before it was implemented, Verizon
challenged the FCC’s authority to issue it. Steve Augustino, Court Dismisses Verizon Net
Neutrality Appeal—For Now, TELECOM LAW MONITOR (Apr. 5, 2011, 11:40 AM),
http://www. telecomlawmonitor.com/2011/04/articles/broadband-1/court-dismisses-verizonnet-neutrality-appeal-for-now/print.html. This challenge has yet to reach a substantive
decision. The order also faces political opposition. In April 2011, the House passed a bill that
would revoke the FCC’s Net-Neutrality Order. See Larry Downes, House Votes to Nullify Net
Neutrality: What’s Next?, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://techliberation.com/2011/04/12/house-votes-to-nullify-net-neutrality-whatsnext/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+techliberation
+%28Technology+Liberation+Front%29. This move is unlikely to have any practical effect
as the bill is unlikely to pass in the Senate or be signed by President Obama, but it
demonstrates the politicization of the net-neutrality debate.
44

47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).

45

Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, ¶ 1.

46

Id. at 11-22.
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applications and content, and consumers.47 Yoo sees vigorous competition between
Internet applications—in part because network neutrality norms have allowed
applications easy market entry. For last-mile Internet connectivity, however, there is
much less competition and network neutrality rules may make small-scale entry
impossible. Given this state of competition between applications and much less
competition between last-mile providers, Yoo finds it anomalous that proposals to
regulate network neutrality norms would reduce the ways in which last-mile
providers may compete in order to promote and protect the already vigorous
competition between applications.48 “[M]andating interoperability commodifies
bandwidth in ways that sharply limit opportunities to compete on dimensions other
than price, which reinforces the advantages enjoyed by the largest and most
established players.”49 In the absence of network neutrality rules, Yoo argues, there
may be new opportunities to compete to provide the last mile of Internet
connectivity. “Providers confronting cost disadvantages inherent in the smaller scale
of their operations can survive by tailoring their networks to the needs of subgroups
who value a particular type of network services particularly highly in much the same
manner that specialty stores [s]urvive in a world dominated by one-stop shopping.”50
In short, Yoo sees in network neutrality regulation the potential for a forced
homogenization of Internet service providers, a process that allows the smallest
possible range of providers of last-mile service. If policy can encourage competition
there, Yoo is relatively unconcerned that the current, robust competition in
applications will be harmed—if there are multiple, competing access points to the
Internet, violations of network neutrality principles will have little negative effect on
competition.51
Economist Gary Becker and colleagues reach a similar conclusion to Yoo,
though they do not share his focus on a lack of competition in last-mile service.
Instead, they find that “there is [already] significant and growing competition among
broadband access providers,” and because of that competition, network neutrality
regulation is unnecessary.52 At baseline, they see a competitive Internet access
47
Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt
Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23,
26-27 (2004) (“[A]ny chain of production is only as efficient as its least competitive link,
which in the case of the Internet is undoubtedly the last mile.”).
48

Id.

49

Id. at 28.

50

Id. at 27.

51

See Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 584 (2007) (“Once a sufficient number of
last-mile options exists, it would matter little if one network chose to make Yahoo! its
preferred search engine.” (Yoo)); see also Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart
Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275, 278 (2005) (“As broadband service providers (BSPs) and
other Internet service and applications providers seek to expand and diversify their range of
consumer offerings by integrating into other network layers, policymakers should not
proscribe such layer-jumping. Rather, they should be agnostic with regard to the intelligence
of broadband networks in general.”).
52

Gary S. Becker, Dennis W. Carlton, & Hal S. Sider, Net Neutrality and Consumer
Welfare, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497, 498-99 (2010).
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market that has strong incentives to invest in new technology and network upgrades.
“[F]irms compete to attract new customers and retain existing ones by attempting to
be the first to offer higher service quality as well as through price competition.”53
Like Yoo, they see network neutrality regulation as an impediment to that
competition: “Net neutrality . . . is properly considered a form of price regulation
because it limits the form of pricing that can be practiced. Such regulations thus
limit a broadband provider’s revenue opportunities and its ability to differentiate
itself from competitors, and thereby stifle incentives to invest and innovate.”54 Like
Yoo, Becker and colleagues believe that in the absence of network neutrality
regulation, service providers will not discriminate against specific Internet
applications in the way that the FCC and other network neutrality advocates fear:
“[A]ttempts by a broadband access provider to limit access to Internet content would
likely result in the loss of subscribers that prefer unrestricted access, which, in turn,
provides a competitive constraint that limits incentives for such actions.”55
Professors Thomas Hazlett and Joshua Wright approach the problem from a
slightly different angle, but also conclude that the Network Neutrality rules may
harm innovation and competition.56 They identify a host of network neutrality
violations that have long been a part of the Internet.57 The potential harm of these
network neutrality violations is anticompetitive foreclosure.58 “Actions by firms
resulting in this outcome are already illegal under the antitrust laws, where the ‘rule
of reason’ is employed to separate socially beneficial practices form those that are
harmful. [Network Neutrality] goes far further than existing law, categorically
prohibiting various forms of economic integration in a manner equivalent to
antitrust’s per se rule . . . . In this case . . . conduct that is typically highly efficient,
promoting investment and innovation . . . .”59 For Hazlett and Wright, innovation
stems not simply from trying to open a neutral Internet to all comers, but from
allowing firms with an innovative product to enter into relationships to get that
product to the masses. For example, Hazlett and Wright identify an early source of
Google’s growth: “[A] fledgling Google wagered its future by paying dominant ISP
AOL to feature its search utility as a default application on its subscribers’ start-up
page . . . .”60 It was only through a network neutrality violation that this Internet
innovator was able to grow.
53

Id. at 503-06.

54

Id. at 513.

55

Id. at 502. In other words, access providers will leave access to the platform alone
when it is efficient to do so. If it would be more efficient to sell limited Internet access at a
lower price, then they will do that. Becker et al. argue that Farrell and Weiser’s ICE will
function, leading to the most efficient outcome.
56
Thomas W. Hazlett and Joshua D. Wright, The Law and Economics of Network
Neutrality 6 (George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 11-36,
Sept. 12, 2011).
57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id.
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Another group of commentators takes the opposite approach. Instead of seeing
the potential for innovation to grow from business arrangements between existing
Internet players, they see the source of innovation as Internet applications’ nearly
costless access to the basic Internet platform. Professor Tim Wu is a leading voice
in this camp. Wu fears that Internet service providers do have a monopoly on access
to the Internet, and that they face a strong temptation to block or slow disfavored
sites and applications—providing what he calls “access tiering.” “[T]here are
several problematic sides to access tiering. You have, say, AT&T with a monopoly
over broadband in a given area. AT&T makes an exclusive deal with Yahoo! to
provide preferred searches on AT&T’s network. As a consequence, the Yahoo!
engine loads faster than any of its competitors.”61
In a recent book, Wu proposes a “Separations Principle” to protect innovation
and easy and cheap entry to the Internet as a platform:
A Separations Principle would mean the creation of a salutary distance
between each of the major functions or layers in the information
economy. It would mean that those who develop information, those who
own the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control
the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another.62
Returning to the focus of this Article, the Separations Principle would also mean that
platform providers could not discriminate between or make special deals with some
content providers or platform applications.
This Separations Principle is
functionally very similar to network neutrality principles.
Wu identifies three broad justifications for the Separations Principle which he
draws from his historical examinations of communications industries. First, Wu sees
power that spreads across multiple levels of a communications industry as inherently
corrupting. “You cannot serve two masters, and the objectives of creating
information are often at odds with those of disseminating it.”63 Second, and related,
Wu justifies the separations principle as necessary to “prevent[] stagnation and
repression of business innovation, especially repression abetted by the state. [The
Separations Principle] also promotes vitality and innovation in different parts of the
information economy by preventing one layer from smothering the others.”64 This
“smothering” is Wu’s primary fear related to the Internet—that gatekeepers to the
platform will limit competition in platform applications. However, as Farrell and
Weiser point out, in many situations, platform owners may not have an incentive to
do that, and in others, it may be useful for the platform to limit applications in order
to remain competitive a platforms market.65 Further, it seems odd that his focus is
61

Wu & Yoo, supra note 51, at 582.

62

TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 304 (2010).

63

Id. at 305.

64

Id. at 306.

65

See supra text accompanying notes 9-17. This third justification seems to have the
possibility to cut against network neutrality. For example, according to Yoo, network
neutrality serves to aid platform applications at the expense of diversification and competition
in the Internet access market. But because of Wu’s focus on protecting innovation and
competition exclusively—or at least primarily—in the Internet applications market, he glosses
over the potential competitive losses that network neutrality could cause elsewhere. Wu
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on potential smothering of the vibrant applications market, rather than on restrictions
on competition in the more limited market for Internet access.
Wu’s perspective does not square well with Farrell & Weiser’s concept of
internalizing complementary efficiencies. ICE suggests that Internet service
providers will not discriminate against some applications unless it will be efficient to
do so, perhaps by allowing the service provider to lower prices and attract more
customers. Wu, however, has a host of counterarguments for why platform owners
might not follow an efficient path, arguments that align neatly with the exceptions to
ICE identified by Farrell & Weiser. One exception to ICE is where the platform
owner does not want applications to compete with some other source of revenue.
Wu argues that this example is directly relevant: “If a product being offered over the
network-say, Internet voice (“VoIP”) for $5 a month-competes with an established
revenue source (telephone service, offered at $30 a month), the temptation to block it
is strong.”66 Wu is also concerned that Internet service providers will fail to take the
rational, efficient strategy suggested by ICE because they are not rational actors. In
the wireless network context, networks may limit technology that may be used on
the network because they are following a harmful cultural model of how a network
should operate.67 This model is one that was learned from the Bell telephone
company, and it entails the company seeking, even against its best interest in
attracting customers, to dominate every facet of its network.68
Wu and Yoo present two extremes of the debate over network neutrality, but
several commentators occupy a middle ground with less sweeping proposals. For
example, Professor James Speta argues that networks should be required to
interconnect, but the details of the relationships between them should not be
regulated.
This proposed approach would require interconnection between
backbones and other Internet carriers and between both Internet and
telephone carriers . . . . It would not, however, require the fundamental
unbundling associated with cable open access demands.
The
interconnection requirement . . . ensures that the Internet remains a single
comes out soundly in favor of network neutrality. “[A] vibrant information economy cannot
countenance discrimination at a level so basic as transmission on a public network. If the
carrier is determined to capture greater profits, the carrier ought to be obliged to do so by
expanding his capacity . . . .” Wu, supra note 62, at 311. Wu explicitly rejects the benefits of
competition other than uniform-product price competition. Internet service providers may be
better or worse, but they may not experiment with different offerings or pricing patterns.
66

Wu & Yoo, supra note 51, at 578. Wu acknowledges that in the presence of network
neutrality regulation, the service provider could simply raise Internet connection prices to
$25/month, making VoIP and telephone service the same price to the consumer. But this is
not a desirable outcome from a policy standpoint. It stops the provider from charging
different prices for phone and data services, which likely have very different demands, and
mandates an inefficient, one-size-fits-all model.
67

See Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone and Consumer Choice in
Mobile Broadband 27 (New Am. Found.: Wireless Future Program, Working Paper No. 17,
2007), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/WorkingPaper17_Wireless
NetNeutrality_Wu.pdf.
68

Id.
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network, while limiting the threat that heavy-handed regulation would
pose to the Internet’s vibrancy.69
While Speta gives Internet service providers much more leeway than Wu, he would
include a requirement that interconnection not be “unreasonably discriminatory.”70
This might allow an Internet gatekeeper to offer its customers special speed or
services for some types of applications, or offer higher speeds to applications that
were willing to purchase it. It most likely would not, however, allow an Internet
service provider to select one search engine exclusively, blocking access to others.
Though commentators are split on whether network neutrality principles are
valuable and should be expanded, they have been well developed. Those who argue
that they should be expanded to cover higher-level Internet platforms draw on a set
of rules that is stable enough to consider what that application might mean.
However, network neutrality is not the only potential method of analysis for
considering novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms. The next section
examines antitrust tying doctrine and its possible application to novel neutrality
claims.
IV. ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND RECENT ATTEMPTS TO
APPLY ANTITRUST TO INTERNET PLATFORMS
The principles established in the FCC’s Network Neutrality Order do not create
the only framework for examining discriminatory behavior by Internet-based
platforms.71 In many cases, non-neutral behavior can be framed as tying
arrangements or similar restraints. Legal and economic scholars have long
considered and developed tying doctrine. Though the doctrine itself is imperfect, the

69

James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 229 (2002).
70

Id. at 276.

71

Although network neutrality challenges to date have been based on the FCC’s
regulatory authority, it is possible that network neutrality advocates could base a challenge on
antitrust law. Part IV examines ways in which antitrust law could be used to mount a
neutrality-type challenge against Internet platforms. Such an antitrust-based analysis is likely
to be available and unaffected by the FCC’s Order. In Verizon v. Trinko, the plaintiff
purchased telephone service from Verizon, over lines owned by AT&T. He claimed that
AT&T discriminated against Verizon customers in providing access to the lines, in violation
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Sherman Act. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 402-05 (2004). The parallel to
network neutrality here is clear. Importantly, the 1996 Telecommunications Act at issue in
Trinko is the Act on which the FCC bases its authority for the Network Neutrality Report and
Order. See Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, ¶ 64. The antitrust claim hinged on
whether local-exchange-carrier duties imposed by the 1996 Act can form the basis for an
antitrust claim. The Court held that they cannot: “[J]ust as the 1996 Act preserves claims that
satisfy existing antitrust standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond existing
antitrust standards . . . .” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407. While the immediate effect of Trinko was to
stop a neutrality-type claim from moving forward, a broader lesson from the case is that where
neutrality claims fit within an existing antitrust framework, other neutrality regulations will
not stop an antitrust case that touches on neutrality issues. See Geoffrey Manne, Net
Neutrality
and
Trinko,
TRUTH
ON
THE
MARKET
(Apr.
4,
2011),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/04/04/net-neutrality-and-trinko/.
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framework is well-suited to balance competing effects on competition and
innovation that are at the heart of neutrality claims.
It is not immediately obvious that neutrality claims focused on Internet platforms
are attempts to restrict tying arrangements, but they can easily be re-framed as such.
In a tying arrangement, a seller agrees to sell one product (the tying product) only if
the purchaser will also buy a second product (the tied product). In a famous
example, a seller of canning machines and canning salt tied its machines to its salt,
so that users of its machines could not purchase salt from its competitors.72 This
framework is easily applied to the Internet platforms discussed in Part V. For
example, in blocking some apps that compete with its own proprietary app, Twitter
has attempted to tie its own microblogging service to its app for creating and reading
microblog posts.73 From the opposite perspective, traditional tying arrangements can
be re-framed in terms of neutral access to a platform. In the canning salt example
above, the canning machine represents a canning platform that could potentially be
used in conjunction with software (salt) from the platform owner or from other salt
companies. But the canning machine manufacturer, as the platform owner, closed
the platform to outside developers (salt sellers), allowing only its own salt to
interface with the machines.
A. The Basics of Tying Doctrine
Courts analyze tying arrangements under what is known as the “quasi-per se
rule.”74 It is similar to a per se rule in that a plaintiff is not required to identify
specific anticompetitive effects of the tying arrangement, but three market conditions
must be demonstrated before this per se illegality is triggered.75 A tying arrangement
is per se illegal if and only if a substantial amount of interstate commerce is
involved,76 the seller offers two products exclusively as a unit,77 and the seller has
“economic power” in the market for the tying product.78 If these conditions are not
72

See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).

73

In that case, a user need not use any mobile app, but if they use one, they must use the
Twitter app, or some other app that Twitter has not blocked from it API.
74

See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 n.2 (1st Cir.
1993) (“Tying is sometimes also described as a per se offense but, since some element of
power must be shown and defenses are effectively available, ‘quasi’ per se might be a better
label.”); see also, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400 (2009).
75

See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11–12 (1984) (“It is clear . .
. that every refusal to sell two products separately cannot be said to restrain competition. If
each of the products may be purchased separately in a competitive market, one seller’s
decision to sell the two in a single package imposes no unreasonable restraint on either
market, particularly if competing suppliers are free to sell either the entire package or its
several parts.”).
76

See id. at 16 (“If only a single purchaser were ‘forced’ with respect to the purchase of a
tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be sufficient to warrant the concern
of antitrust law.”).
77

See id. at 12.

78

See id. at 12–15.
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met, a tying arrangement may be analyzed under the default antitrust standard, the
rule of reason.
The simplest of the three prongs of the quasi-per se rule is the substantial amount
of interstate commerce requirement which is easily met and seldom stops cases from
moving forward.79 The Court has set a very lenient bar to establishing substantial
volume: “normally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of
business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de
minimis, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie . . . .”80 In applying tying doctrine to
Internet platforms, even those that offer free services, the substantial amount
interstate commerce element is likely to be easily met by advertising or any sales
that are associated with the platform or platform applications.
The two-product requirement is somewhat more challenging.81 The Court has
been clear that simply because a product may be split into its constituent parts, does
not mean that it is two products, rather than one. This distinction can be especially
difficult in the Internet platform context where the value of the platform is often
found largely or partly in its applications. To make this distinction, the Court has
established a general standard that a tying arrangement involves two products when
there is demand for the tying and tied products to be purchased separately. For
example, in Jefferson Parish, the Court faced the question of whether anesthesia
services and surgical services that require anesthesia are one or two products.82 The
Court focused “not on the functional relation between [the two services], but rather
on the character of the demand for the two items.”83 The Court framed this question
as whether consumers consider and purchase anesthesiological services separately
from the surgical services with which they are necessarily used. The Court found
that they do, and that surgery and anesthesia are different services operating in
different markets.84 This element could present a special challenge in application to
79
For example, in Fortner I, the Court did not discuss the possibility of denying a claim
that involved less than $4 million in annual sales. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) [“Fortner II”].
80
Id. at 501. Notably, the foreclosure rationale for scrutinizing tying arrangements is
based on a tenuous rationale and has been largely abandoned by both economists and courts.
See Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Reassessing Tying Arrangements at the End of AT&T’s iPhone
Exclusivity, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 297, 357-60 (2011).
81
At times, the two-product requirement is obviously met. For example, in Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court did not question whether
the land (the tying product) and shipping services (the tied product) were separate goods.
82

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 6 (1984). In that case, a hospital
had agreed that all anesthesia services would be provided by a single anesthesiology practice.
Id. If hospital services are a single product that is made up of both surgical services and
anesthesiological services, this agreement would not constitute a tying arrangement. Instead,
the agreement would simply shape the nature and value of the single service provided by the
hospital. Id. at 18–19. If, on the other hand, surgery and anesthesia are two different services,
the agreement effectively tied surgical services provided by any physician in the hospital to
anesthesiology services provided by the selected anesthesiologists. Id.
83

Id. at 19.

84

Id. at 22–23. It based this holding on findings that surgery and anesthesia are billed
separately, and that “patients or surgeons often request specific anesthesiologists to come to a
hospital and provide anesthesia, and that the choice of an individual anesthesiologist separate
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some Internet platforms. For example, it is not entirely clear if the Twitter platform
and the apps with which users interact with the platform are one or two products.85
Some users may only use Twitter with these apps, never without them, while others
may not use these apps at all.
The third element of a tying case, economic power, once required “a
monopolistic position,”86 but today’s standard allows a showing of economic power
through a market share falling far short of monopoly,87 or by showing that the tying
good is sufficiently unique to confer some power.88 The Court describes this
economic power as

from the choice of a hospital is particularly frequent in respondent’s specialty.” Id. at 22; see
also Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (showing that the
majority and the dissenters disagreed about whether advertisements in morning and evening
papers occupied the same or different markets).
85

See infra Section V.c. for further application of tying doctrine to API neutrality.

86

See, e.g., Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608–09. In Times-Picayune, the Court found that
the tying arrangement was not anticompetitive because the defendant lacked “dominance”
over the tying advertising market. Id. at 612–13. However, as the dissent notes, this result
was nearly certain given the excessively broad manner in which it defined the market. Id. at
628; see also id. at 612–13 (describing the broad market definition to which the dissent
refers).
87
Early cases did require the tying seller to occupy a “monopolistic position.” See, e.g.,
Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608–09. However, later cases required only “economic power.”
A large market share is one way to demonstrate market share, but the Court has established
other ways. “Market dominance . . . is by no means the only test of whether the seller has the
requisite economic power. Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic
power may be inferred from the tying product’s desirability to consumers or from uniqueness
in its attributes.” United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
88

See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969):

The standard of “sufficient economic power” does not, as the District Court held,
require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout
the market for the tying product. Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that
the economic power over the tying product can be sufficient . . . even though the
power exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market . . . . As we said in
the Loew’s case: “Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic
power may be inferred from the tying product’s desirability to consumers or from
uniqueness in its attributes.” (citation omitted).
In Fortner II, the Court refined this test to require that
[T]he seller has the power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to
require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a
completely competitive market. In short, the question is whether the seller has some
advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) [hereinafter “Fortner II”].
The Court recently (and wisely) abandoned one indicator of market power, the presence of a
patent. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (“We conclude that
the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support . . . a presumption [of market
power.]”).
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[T]he power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to
require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted
in a completely competitive market. In short, the question is whether the
seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for
the tying product.89
Though the Court’s tying doctrine has been unchanged for years,90 it may not be
as stable as it appears. Justice O’Connor openly challenged the quasi-per se rule in
her concurrence in Jefferson Parish.91 The Court sees the potential for a weak
product to be protected by the power of a strong product in another, tied market. But
the Court fails to consider the negative effects that such an arrangement could have
on the competitors engaging in it. If a strong product does indeed allow a weak
product to gain market share on its coattails, the attachment of the weak product will
reduce the strong product’s draw. This undercuts the Court’s assumption that tying
is used to protect tied products from competition, and the very basis for the quasi-per
se rule. Instead, gains made by the tied product are likely to be offset by losses to
the tying product.92 Though the Court has not resolved this tension, several dissents
and concurrences have attempted to identify other rationales and methods for
antitrust scrutiny of tying arrangements. This debate mirrors the economic debate,
discussed in Part II, over whether and when a closed platform or one that
discriminates between applications may cause competitive harm.
The first example of this is in Justice White’s dissent to Fortner Enterprises v.
United States Steel (“Fortner I”).93 Justice White sought to identify specific
economic harms that tying may cause. He identified two primary harms that may
stem from tying arrangements where the tying product has economic power: “the use
of power over one product [(1)] to attain power over another, [and (2)] otherwise to
distort freedom of trade and competition in the second product.”94 Justice White
thought that tying could allow a monopolist to use one monopoly to gain another, or
could cause “distortions” in the tied market by forcing non-tied competitors out of
the tied market or by making it difficult to enter the tied market.
89

Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620.

90

Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–10 (“It is far too late in the
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable
‘per se.’ The rule was first enunciated in International Salt Co. v. United States . . . and has
been endorsed by this Court many times since. The rule also reflects congressional policies
underlying the antitrust laws.”).
91

Id. at 35.

92

The Court attempted to get around this paradox by imposing the market power
requirement. The only products that may shelter tied products from the forces of competition
are those with market power. The problem is that the seller still faces a tradeoff between
raising prices, which ordinarily raises no competitive concern, and tying, which does.
Without some theory as to why imposing a tying arrangement is worse for consumers or for
competition than simply raising prices, there is no justification for condemning tying
arrangements.
93

Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 510 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting).
94

Id. at 512.
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The idea that one monopoly may be “leveraged” into another using a tying
arrangement has been extensively considered and for the most part discredited.95
Market “distortions,” however, are where most commentators now look for harm
from tying arrangements—this is the angle taken by Justice O’Connor in her
concurrence in Jefferson Parish.96 O’Connor attempts to reform tying doctrine
under the rule of reason, focusing on the economic consequences of potentially
anticompetitive business practices.
O’Connor begins by carefully spelling out the distortions that ties can have on a
market. She then lays out a doctrine that aims to identify those arrangements that
will have such negative effects. The basic harm that O’Connor sees in tying
arrangements, (or in exclusive, closed platforms) is that they may “have a
demonstrable exclusionary impact in the tied product [(or applications)] market . . .
.”97 This is only a problem when the impact is to make the tied market less
competitive.98 O’Connor sees this possibility in two situations—in neutrality terms,
exclusivity can be a problem when: the closing of a platform either drives out
existing application makers, or meaningfully raises barriers to entry to an
applications market.99 In other words, a closed platform alone is not sufficient to
demonstrate anticompetitive harm. It obviously raises the barriers to entry into the
applications market for that platform, but O’Connor’s tying analysis is not
implicated unless it makes a broader applications market, including other platforms,
less competitive. Notably, these are the same types of harms identified by
economists focusing on platform decisions to open or close. As Farrell and Weiser
demonstrate with ICE, when only a single platform and the applications associated
with that platform are involved, the platform owner is likely to open the platform
when it is efficient to do so.
O’Connor proposes specific rules for the analysis of tying arrangements. Her
analysis overlaps with, but is meaningfully different from the quasi-per se rule, and
is easily applied to novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms. First, she adopts

95

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 199 (2d ed. 2001) (“It may seem
obvious that two monopolies are better than one, but since the products are used in
conjunction with one another to produce the final product or service in which the consumer is
interested . . . , it is far from obvious.”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372–75
(1978); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19, 20–23 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation,
51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290–92 (1956).
96

See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
97

Id.

98

See id. at 36 (“Tying may be economically harmful primarily in the rare cases where
power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market power in the
market for the tied product.”).
99

Note that if the platform does not have market power, its discrimination is unlikely to
cause barriers to entry that extend to a broader applications market. Nor does each platform
have a distinct applications market separate from applications markets associated with
competing platforms. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
471 (1992) (holding that Kodak may have market power in a parts and repair market for its
machinery, where its machines do not have power in the market for that type of machine).
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two of the three requirements of the quasi-per se rule: the two product requirement
and market power requirements.100
In addition to these two requirements drawn from the quasi-per se rule,
O’Connor also requires evidence of a likely negative effect on competition from the
tying arrangement.
[T]here must be a substantial threat that the tying seller will acquire
market power in the tied-product market. No such threat exists if the tiedproduct market is occupied by many stable sellers who are not likely to be
driven out by the tying, or if entry barriers in the tied-product market are
low.101
This requirement is especially important in the common situation where applications
makers provide applications over several platforms. A single platform excluding
disfavored or competing applications makers from one platform in a competitive
market can have no real harm, so long as the other platforms remain available.102 In a
less competitive platform market, the risks to the tied applications market targeted by
O’Connor’s analysis are the potential for competition in that market to be reduced by
the tied good obtaining market power and forcing other competitors out, or obtaining
market power and significantly raising barriers to entry for other would-be
participants in the tied applications market. These foci—requiring market power in
the tying platform market and watching the tied applications market for foreclosure
and exclusion—are consistent with the platform economics discussed in Section II.
By focusing on actual effects of an arrangement, O’Connor departs from the
quasi-per se rule. Rather than leading to a conclusion of illegality, her requirements
are threshold questions for an analysis of potential illegality. “The ultimate decision
whether a tie-in is illegal under the antitrust laws should depend upon the
demonstrated economic effects of the challenged agreement. It may, for example, be
entirely innocuous that the seller exploits its control over the tying product to ‘force’
the buyer to purchase the tied product.”103 In applying tying analyses to neutrality
100
See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37-39. She does not adopt the substantial amount of
interstate commerce requirement, but it has very seldom had teeth in analyzing tying
arrangements. Her market power requirement basically adopts the Courts existing rule, but
she puts her own emphasis on the two-product requirement:

For products to be treated as distinct, the tied product must, at a minimum, be one that
some consumers might wish to purchase separately without also purchasing the tying
product. When the tied product has no use other than in conjunction with the tying
product, a seller of the tying product can acquire no additional market power by
selling the two products together.
Id. at 39. This standard is significantly more demanding than the Court’s two market
standard, and would make direct application of O’Connor’s tying analysis to platform
neutrality claims difficult, since by definition, a platform application cannot be used without
the platform, regardless of whether the two are available in a single or separate markets. For
this reason, the analysis proposed in Section VI draws on both the Court’s doctrine and
O’Connor’s framework to reach a slightly less stringent two-product analysis.
101

Id. at 38.

102

This situation is especially relevant to digital markets and API. See infra Sections V.c
and V.d.
103

Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 41 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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claims, this is an especially important insight. Though commentators disagree on
whether and when platform neutrality is necessary, the debate strongly suggests that
the value of neutrality and platform openness is context specific, and that actions that
violate neutrality principles may have value.
V. APPLICATION OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND ANTITRUST FRAMEWORKS TO
THREE INTERNET PLATFORMS
Network neutrality debates began with a firm connection to the physical pipes
and basic access points on which the Internet is built. The debate was a reaction to
the potential for the owners of infrastructure to block, slow, or toll parts of the
Internet for some portion of users. Network neutrality advocates urge that policies
governing access to the Internet itself must be neutral. But recently, the concept of
neutrality has reached beyond the ways in which consumers access the Internet to the
Internet platforms and services that they use once they get there. Instead of focusing
on access to Internet platforms and services being in some way neutral, the new
debate is over whether Internet-based platforms must themselves be neutral. Some
of these platform neutrality debates have become familiar terms—including those
specifically addressed here: search neutrality, API neutrality, and online marketplace
neutrality.
Each of these novel neutrality claims focuses on a platform that is built upon the
Internet platform.104 One of the most prominent of these new neutralities focuses on
Internet search—whether search engines must remain neutral to all Internet content
or may promote or hold back some sites in their search algorithms. This section
examines search neutrality, API neutrality, and online marketplace neutrality claims.
It considers each neutrality type and the platforms to which they are applied under
both network neutrality and antitrust principles. For each of these “higher-level”
Internet platforms there have been specific calls to extend network neutrality
principles. For example, even as the FCC Network Neutrality Rule was proposed,
the founder of the specialized search engine Foundem argued that their focus only on
broadband providers was too narrow:
The Federal Communications Commission has proposed “network
neutrality” rules, which would prohibit Internet service providers from
discriminating against or charging premiums for certain services or
applications on the Web. The commission is correct that ensuring equal
access to the infrastructure of the Internet is vital, but it errs in directing
its regulations only at service providers like AT&T and Comcast.105

104

For this reason I refer to these platforms as higher-level Internet platforms.

105

Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search, but You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A27,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/28raff.html. Raff continued to
argue that major search engines, too, should be covered by neutrality rules.
Today, search engines like Google, Yahoo and Microsoft’s new Bing have become the
Internet’s gatekeepers, and the crucial role they play in directing users to Web sites
means they are now as essential a component of its infrastructure as the physical
network itself. The F.C.C. needs to look beyond network neutrality and include
“search neutrality” . . . .
Id.
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In examining these novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms, I demonstrate that
neither of these frameworks works well for analyzing novel neutrality claims.
Section VI proposes reforms to these frameworks.
A. Unique Characteristics of Internet Platforms
These higher-level neutralities have meaningful structural and substantive
differences from typical network neutrality. These differences make it impossible or
harmful to apply network neutrality values to them and demonstrate the imperfection
of antitrust rules for analyzing them. There are three key differences between the
Internet gatekeepers to which network neutrality principles are applied and these
higher-level platforms—these characteristics also distinguish them from the goods
and services to which antitrust laws have most frequently been applied.
First, use of one Internet platform usually does not preclude a user from also
using a competing platform. This is much less true of broadband providers, the
targets of the FCC Neutrality Rule. A consumer who purchases broadband service
from one company may switch to a direct competitor, but is very unlikely to
patronize more than one fixed provider at a time, or more than one wireless
broadband provider at a time. Search engines provide the opposite extreme. If a
user is dissatisfied with the results returned by one search engine, they can quickly
re-run the search on another. Most search engines have extremely low learning costs
to a user who has used any search engine. For other Internet platforms, switching
costs may be higher—for example switching between social networks may be
difficult, and may require convincing others to also migrate to a new platform.
However, unlike broadband providers, a user can reasonably use multiple social
networks, and thus can transition gradually between them or use them
simultaneously for different purposes. Facebook and Twitter provide a useful
example. It is common for users to belong to both social networks. Some users may
use one for some purposes and another for others. Many applications are available
that allow a user to use both networks at once without clearly distinguishing between
the two.106
Second, because switching costs between higher-level Internet platforms tend to
be low, an inferior platform is unlikely to be able to maintain market power for long.
In some ways, switching costs are able to imitate market power by locking
customers in. To overtake a competitor, a platform or service must not only be
better, but must be sufficiently better to justify incurring the costs of the switch.107
This can slow down the effects of competition. Because competition generally is
likely to be more efficient in higher level Internet platforms than in broadband
106
A cottage industry has sprung up around social networks for the major purpose of
facilitating use of multiple social networks. For example, there are a number of apps and
services that allow users to post or read messages from many social networks at once. See
Jaymar Cabebe, HootSuite, TweetDeck, or Seesmic?, THE DOWNLOAD BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011,
4:43 PM), http://download.cnet.com/8301-2007_4-20088869-12/hootsuite-tweetdeck-orseesmic/.
107
See Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1974
(Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007) (1967) (“[S]witching costs can segment an
otherwise undifferentiated market as firms focus on their established customers and do not
compete aggressively for their rivals’ buyers, letting oligopolists extract positive profits.”).
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providers, it is difficult to justify application of neutrality principles to higher-level
platforms without identifying specific harms caused by their violation. Though
switching costs are likely to be low, the platforms examined here each have some
level of network effects making market entrance more difficult by giving larger
platforms an advantage over less-established platforms. There is also variation in the
switching costs imposed by Internet platforms. Search engines have low switching
costs—users of one search engine generally can immediately switch to another. But
social networks may have higher switching costs, since part of the value of the
network is not its technical superiority, but the fact that a user’s friends also use it.
Importantly, though these network effects may make market entry more difficult, an
effect that makes a popular service better does not inherently harm consumers in any
obvious way.
Third, higher-level Internet platforms are more likely than broadband providers
to rely on violations of neutrality principles for their basic business models. Though
Professor Yoo argues that allowing broadband providers to violate network
neutrality principles can foster competition between them, it is possible for them to
compete transparently without blocking or unreasonably discriminating between
Internet applications. For search engines, on the other hand, discrimination between
search results is the very service on which they compete—the best search engine is
the one that best discriminates between potential search results.108 Similarly,
enforcing a strong transparency principle would hamper competition by reducing
engine’s ability to differentiate—anyone could copy the most successful search
engines. Search engines would then have to compete on some factor other than the
service that is at the heart of what they do—search.
The remainder of this Section examines three of these higher-level Internet
platforms that have faced novel neutrality claims and applies network neutrality and
antitrust frameworks to them.
B. Search Neutrality
Calls for neutrality-based regulation of search engines have recently become
common. In the United States, as in much of the world, regulation of search means
regulation of the currently dominant search engine, Google. While other search
engines occupy meaningful shares of the market, none have faced the threat of
regulation that Google does. That threat has recently become very real. In June,
2011, the FTC launched a broad probe into Google’s search and advertising
practices.109 It is uncertain if this probe will result in any action against Google, but
it demonstrates that a major U.S. enforcement agency is looking closely at Google
and search neutrality.110 Two United States Senators have also urged the FTC to
108

This fact requires search neutrality to focus on the more difficult question of whether
the discrimination between search results is appropriate, rather than simply aiming to identify
whether there is such discrimination.
109

See Joe Mullin, Google Defends Itself on Antitrust as States Pile On, PAIDCONTENT.ORG
(June 24, 2009, 12:24 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-google-defends-itself-onantitrust-as-states-pile-on/.
110
Commissioner Thomas Rosch has indicated that the FTC might like to challenge
Google under its authority to regulate unfair methods of competition rather than under more
traditional antitrust standards because a “Section 5” case would not require any demonstration
of harm to competition. See Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright, The FTC Makes its Google
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investigate whether Google favors its own products in its search results.111 In
Europe, where Google occupies a larger share of the market than it does in the
United States, the case against Google is well underway.112
The FTC investigation and the EU case follow a series of calls, from both
commentators and Google competitors, for search neutrality enforcement. As with
other Internet neutralities, search neutrality fears tend to focus on the possibility that
the platform will favor some content providers over others, giving users a product
that is harmfully non-neutral. Some companies have made specific complaints that
Google disfavors or de-lists their websites, and such complaints have led to a formal
investigation in the EU. In the U.S., TripAdvisor.com, WebMD.com, Yelp.com, and
Citysearch.com have complained that their sites have been pushed down in Google
Searches as Google-owned products have been introduced at the top of search
results.113 Google has responded to these concerns by attempting to focus on search
users, not the content providers that may appear in search results: “We built Google
for users, not websites, and our goal is to give users answers . . . .”114 Nonetheless,
businesses built upon websites argue that being prominent among the returns to a
common search on Google is essential for some business models to succeed.115 In
this environment, search engine optimization, or simply SEO,116 has become a
cottage industry.117
Concerns over the potential harm caused by search engine tinkering have led
commentators to argue that neutrality principles should be applied to search engines,
and to Google in particular. Not surprisingly, claims that network-neutrality
Investigation Official, now What?, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (June 24, 2011),
http://tech
liberation.com/2011/06/24/the-ftc-makes-its-google-investigation-official-nowwhat/?utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+techliberation+%28Tech
nology+Liberation+Front%29.
111

Matt McGee, US Senators Call for FTC Investigation into Google’s Search Results,
SEARCH ENGING LAND (Dec. 19, 2011 ), http://searchengineland.com/us-senators-call-

for-ftc-investigation-into-googles-search-results-105131 .
112

See Rob D. Young, Report: Google EU Antitrust Expands, Up to 9 Complainants,
SEARCH
ENGINE
WATCH
(Aug.
3,
2011),
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2098919/Report-Google-EU-Antitrust-Expands-Up-to9-Complainants; Mathew Ingram, Google Fights Growing Battle Over “Search Neutrality”,
GIGAOM (Dec. 17, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/17/google-antitrust-searchneutrality/.
113

See Amir Efrati, Rivals Say Google Plays Favorites, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2010,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870405870457601563
018856897 2.html.
114

Id.

115

See id. (“The complaints underscore how crucial Google searches are to virtually every
business online, and the increasingly close scrutiny of how Google operates.”).
116

Search engine optimization, often referred to simply as “SEO” is a euphemism for
“getting a prominent listing on Google.”
117
See What is SEO / Search Engine Optimization?, SEARCH ENGINE LAND,
http://searchengineland.com/guide/what-isseo?utm_source=sel&utm_medium=home&utm_campaign=nav (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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principles should be applied to search engines have been led by Internet service
providers to whom network neutrality is already applicable. Comcast has argued
that “If the [FCC] were to conclude that an interventionist regulatory regime is
needed to preserve the ‘neutrality’ of the Internet, it could not defensibly apply that
regime to broadband providers but not to Google.”118 Similarly, AT&T has argued
that search engines “determine the information . . . that customers access online
through algorithms that highlight some information, favor certain websites, and even
omit some sites altogether.”119
Following these concerns, some commentators have argued that direct oversight
of the neutrality of search algorithms is necessary. For example, Professors
Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin Lockwood find evidence consistent with the
existence of search bias and argue that
[A]s Google becomes even more dominant, we envision substantially
greater investigation of the effect of Google's linking policies, ultimately
including deeper outside verification and oversight . . . . In the long run,
just as Windows source code and APIs are subject to outside scrutiny, we
expect that search algorithms will require similar external review.120
Edelman and Lockwood find that search engines, particularly Google, are likely to
include their own sites and services as the first or one of the first returns to a set of
typical searches.121 However, as Edelman and Lockwood acknowledge, it is not
obvious that these results indicate bias. If search engines attempt to provide useful
results, it is possible that Google users find Gmail to be a useful return to “mail,”
while Yahoo users find Yahoo Mail to be a useful return.122 Though their results
suggest the possibility of but do not demonstrate bias, Edelman and Lockwood fear
that search engines bias their results “to expand into new sectors, to grant instant free
traffic to their own new services, and to block competitors and would-be
competitors. The incentive for bias is all the stronger because the lack of obvious
benchmarks makes most bias would be difficult to uncover.”123
Edelman and Lockwood are not alone in envisioning agency oversight of search.
A 2010 New York Times editorial suggested that Google should “explain with some
specified level of detail the editorial policy that guides its tweaks. Another
[possibility] would be to give some government commission the power to look at

118

Nate Anderson, Regulating Google’s Results? Law Prof Calls “Search Neutrality”
Incoherent, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2011/01/regulating-googles-results-law-prof-calls-search-neutralityincoherent.ars.
119

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

120

Benjamin Edelman & Benjamin Lockwood, Measuring Bias in “Organic” Web Search,
http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/ (last visited Nov.. 15, 2011).
121

Id.

122

Edelman and Lockwood find that the first few results in any search tend to be the links
on which users click. This, again, is consistent with search result patterns representing either
usefulness or bias.
123

Id.
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those tweaks.”124 Professors Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale explicitly call for such
a “Federal Search Commission.”125 They focus as much on the need to protect the
Internet as a forum for democratic speech as on protecting economic competition
and conclude that either “application and adaptation of common law duties to public
utilities, or the creation of a regulatory framework” to regulate search engines is
necessary to protect against search engine manipulation.126 Elsewhere, Pasquale has
spelled out the bounds of search neutrality that he believes should be enforced by
such a federal agency. His search neutrality principles are generally more modest
and less intrusive than the network neutrality rules.127 Specifically, Pasquale argues
that search engines should not engage in two behaviors:
1)
2)

Stealth marketing (secretly taking cash or other consideration in exchange
for elevating the profile of sites in organic search results)[; and]
De-indexing without notice and explanation (removing legal, non-spam
sites from the index after they have been included in the search engine’s
corpus, and failing to give some explanation to the removed site as to why
it was removed)[.]128

As Professor James Grimmelman points out, much of Pasquale’s proposal fits
neatly under the transparency principle.129 Stealth marketing and de-indexing are
roughly analogous to unreasonable discrimination and no-blocking, but Pasquale’s
criticism of each of these rests not on the search engine’s ability to block or
discriminate against a potential search return, but on its ability to do so opaquely.
Others argue that even the more modest search neutrality principles are
unnecessary.
For example, Grimmelman identifies eight search neutrality
principles130 and finds that they are “unusable as bases for sound search

124

The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/opinion/15thu3.html.
The
considered this as a possibility, and importantly recognizes that
balanced against a need “not to stifle [Google’s] ability to innovate.”

at A30, available at
Times Editorial only
any oversight must be
Id.

125

Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008).
126

Id. at 1208.

127

Frank Pasquale, Search Neutrality as Disclosure and Auditing, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(Feb. 19, 2011, 11:16 AM) http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/02/searchneutrality-as-disclosure-and-auditing.html.
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Id.
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James Grimmelmann, Comment to Search Neutrality as Disclosure and Auditing,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 19, 2011, 11:16 AM) http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2011/02/search-neutrality-as-disclosure-and-auditing.html.
130
The eight principles map roughly onto the three principles underlying the FCC’s
Network Neutrality Rules. They are: equality; objectivity; bias; traffic; relevance; selfinterest; transparency; and manipulation. James Grimmelman, Some Skepticism About Search
Neutrality, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435, 438
(Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, eds. 2010).
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regulation.”131 Grimmelman argues generally that neutrality is incompatible with the
enterprise of search, which has the very purpose of helping users discriminate
between websites.132
1. Neutrality-Based Scrutiny of Search
In the context of this rigorous debate surrounding search neutrality, it is clear that
straightforward application of network neutrality principles—transparency, no
blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination—to search neutrality makes little
sense. Transparency raises serious problems for businesses competing in the search
market. No commercial search engine will be willing to disclose anything more than
general information regarding the algorithm and code that it uses to select, prioritize,
and sort possible returns to a search. To require such a disclosure to users would be
to enable copying of the algorithm, which is a primary asset of a search engine.
Ultimately, such a requirement could make search an untenable business. It might
be possible for a search engine to disclose some information to regulators, rather
than directly to consumers, but this would not serve the purpose behind the
transparency principle—to provide consumers with information about the search
engines between which they are choosing. In search, it may be necessary for
consumers to choose between search engines based on the results that they obtain
from using an engine, rather than transparency of the algorithm that creates those
results. Given the low costs to consumers to switch between search products and the
ability to experiment cheaply with different products, a lack of transparency should
not allow one search engine to gain an edge over others, or harm consumers in some
other way. The results of a search, rather than the process that creates them, are the
real product in which consumers are interested. These results are inherently
transparent.
Blocking and unreasonable discrimination also pose a problem. Discrimination
between different possible search results is the primary basis on which search
engines compete. Ceteris paribus, the search engine that returns more useful results
will attract the most users. It is possible, however, that search engines could
discriminate in less desirable ways133—critics have identified two types of
discrimination and blocking that they argue are unreasonable: discrimination on
behalf of websites affiliated with the search engine and arbitrary blocking or
demotion of a site in the search algorithm.

131
Id. Grimmelman notes the limits of his argument: “Just because search neutrality is
incoherent, it doesn’t follow that search engines deserve a free pass under antitrust,
intellectual property, privacy, or other well-established bodies of law.” Id. This Article
attempts to define the bounds of scrutiny of Internet platforms, including search engines. See
infra Section VI.
132

See generally Grimmelman, supra note 129, at 442-47 (considering the neutrality
principles of equality, objectivity, and bias); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Problem of
Search Engines as Essential Facilities: An Economic and Legal Assessment, in THE NEXT
DIGITAL DECADE, supra note 130; Joshua Wright, Search Bias and Antitrust, TECH.
LIBERATION FRONT (Mar. 24, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/03/24/search-bias-andantitrust/.
133

Edelman and Lockwood provide evidence suggesting (but not demonstrating) that
Google provides unfairly biased search results. See supra text accompanying notes 120-123.
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Edelman and Lockwood argue that the potential bias created by surreptitious
discrimination and blocking justifies government review. While there are legitimate
arguments for targeting specific types of discrimination, the network neutrality
principles provide no principled way to separate necessary discrimination from bad
discrimination.134 Instead, they distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable
discrimination in ways that are not usefully applicable to search. For example, the
Report and Order allows for “reasonable network management,”135 and “[u]seagnostic discrimination[.]”136 Network management simply does not apply in any
clear way to search results. Use-agnostic discrimination allows “[d]ifferential
treatment of traffic that does not discriminate among specific uses of the network or
classes of uses . . . . Use-agnostic discrimination . . . does not interfere with end
users’ choices about which content, applications, services, or devices to use.”137
Every search engine aims not to “interfere with end users’ choices” but to facilitate
those choices. Of course, the difference between facilitation and interference is only
one of success vs. failure. This process, the process in which search engines
necessarily engage, explicitly treats different uses differently. Everyone using a
search engine wants to search, but a person wanting to search for shoes will be
treated differently by a successful search engine than a person searching for driving
directions. The results of the two searches could be usefully arrived at in different
ways. There is no reason for the mechanism underlying the search engine not to
recognize that terms in each search should lead to different sets of results (products
for one and maps for the other). Thus, search has a valuable element that is not useagnostic. Network neutrality principles suggest that this pro-competitive process of
arriving at individualized and useful search results should lead to strong scrutiny of
search engines. But that they target pro-competitive practices that make search
better for consumers suggests that these principles are missing something when
transferred to search.
2. Antitrust Scrutiny of Search
Search neutrality borrows the terms of network neutrality, but it fits more easily
into the framework of an antitrust tying analysis. Under such an analysis, when a
search engine favors some results over others, especially when it favors its own
products or those of its business partners, the search engine functions as the tying
good (and the platform for specific search results) and the products and websites that
receive favored treatment are the tied good (and the platform application or
software). The analogy is imperfect because the tie is not exclusive. If a search
engine favors one search result, it does not do so to the absolute exclusion of other
potential results—websites are more likely to be discriminated against in their
ranking than to be absolutely blocked. But this may be a distinction without a
134

Further, it is possible that there is no such distinction. Discrimination that favors
websites affiliated with a search engine may in fact be more valuable to the users that choose
that search engine. See Wright, supra note 132 (“That search engines compete for the
attention of those consumers, including through search bias, should not be surprising. But it
does not make out a coherent claim of consumer harm.”).
135

Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, ¶ 69.

136

Id. ¶ 73.
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Id.
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difference. There is a limit to how far into search results a user will look, and lower
results are less likely to be clicked.138 Any loosening of the tying arrangement
makes competitive harm less likely, because rather than being required to take a
single search result in exchange for using a search engine, search discrimination just
makes it easier and more likely that a user will choose the favored result with a more
prominent listing.139 Nonetheless, analysis of search neutrality under a tying
framework provides valuable insights into when search neutrality claims have merit.
Recall that under the basic tying doctrine, the quasi-per se rule is triggered upon a
showing that there are two products, that the tying product has economic power, and
that a substantial portion of commerce is involved.140
A search engine as the tying platform and search results as tied good likely
would satisfy the two product requirement. The two markets are the market for
whatever the user is searching for and the market for search engines. Both are
vigorously competitive.141 There can be little doubt that users generally see the two
market decisions as separate and make each decision separately.142 A user looking
for a website that reviews shoes is unlikely to expect that they will end up at a much
different site based on the search engine they use—in fact they are likely to choose
the search engine that they think will most easily lead them to the most useful
website. Clearly there are separate markets for search engines, and for the web
pages that compete to get users’ attention, often through good placement in popular
search engines.
The next question is whether the tying platform—here a search engine—has
market power. This, of course, is a specific inquiry for the competitor at issue, but
today, a Court would be likely to find that Google has market power in search.
Given Google’s hefty share of the web search market, it would likely be difficult for
it to argue that it does not have market power—but it is not clear that this is the
correct result under the doctrine established by the Court. The Court looks not for
some market share, but for economic power. It defines market power as “[T]he
power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require
purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely
competitive market. In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage

138
Bing Pan et al., In Google We Trust: Users’ Decisions on Rank, Position, and
Relevance, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 3 (2007).
139

While this may not mitigate the harm to the specific, disfavored competitor when
ambivalent consumers click on a link simply because it is higher on the page, it does reduce
the harm to consumers. A consumer seeking a specific search result or who prefers a lower
ranked page will still be able to find it through most search engines. See Wright, supra note
132.
140
The substantial volume of commerce prong is seldom determinative and is clearly met
for major search engines. It will not be further discussed here.
141

This may depend on what the user is actually searching for—it is of course possible to
use a search engine to find a product that has a monopoly over its market.
142

There may be exceptions to this generality. For example, a user trying to find a map of
a specific place and wanting to use Google maps may go to Google and search for “Map of
Minneapolis, MN,” knowing that a Google map of the location will likely be the first search
result. (As of this writing, it is).
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not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product.”143 Google’s
power to raise prices or to impose burdensome terms is limited. As Google is fond
of emphasizing, its “[c]ompetition is just one click away.”144 The thing that keeps
Google in its market share is its lack of burdensome terms and the usefulness of its
results, not a special ability to keep users locked into an inferior search engine.
However, Google does have two advantages not shared by its competitors. First,
it offers a wide variety of services that draw users in to its ecosystem, including
Maps, Gmail, Google+ and many others. By offering all of these services, some of
which incur costs if a user decides to switch to another service, Google is able to
keep users within its site for multiple services, simply because it is easier to keep
using a trusted Google service than to try an upstart.145 Furthermore, Google may
benefit from network effects inherent in search whereby the more users that
patronize a single search engine, the more search data that engine has to improve its
services making it harder for competitors to catch up.146 These effects may soften
competition in Internet search, and combined with its market share, it is likely that a
court would find Google to possess the market power necessary to a tying claim.
A challenge that sought to apply tying doctrine to search neutrality could be
successful against Google if it was able to demonstrate that the search engine’s
algorithm systematically favored certain search results in other markets. But like the
result obtained by application of neutrality principles, it is not clear that this is the
right result. Search bias, even if it favors the search engine’s own products or those
of its partners, may be a method of competition. As Professor Joshua Wright argues,
such “bias” could increase the value of search engines by becoming a factor on
which they compete—the winner might not be the engine with the least bias, but the
one with the most useful bias.147 In other words, in what Edelman and Lockwood
call bias, Wright sees search engines providing users with useful results.
143

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977).

144
Adam Kovacevich, Google’s approach to competition, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (May
8, 2009, 9:24 AM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/05/googles-approach-tocompetition.html.
145

Nonetheless, switching costs from Google to Bing or from Google Maps to Mapquest
are very low whether a user has a Gmail account or not.
146
It is unclear how much of Google’s success is actually due to its size. Compare
Benjamin Edelman, In Accusing Microsoft, Google Doth Protest Too Much, HBR BLOG
NETWORK (Feb. 3, 2001, 2:47 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/hbsfaculty/2011/02/in-accusingmicrosoft-google.html (“Of course the reality is that Google’s high market share means
Google gets far more searches than any other search engine . . . . So Google is far better
equipped to figure out what results users favor and to tailor its listings accordingly.”) with
Geoffrey Manne, Microsoft undermines its own case, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Feb. 4, 2011),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/02/04/ microsoft-undermines-its-own-case/:

Perhaps Google is “better equipped to figure out what users favor.” But it seems to
me that only a trivial amount of this advantage is plausibly attributable to Google’s
scale instead of its engineering and innovation. The fact that Microsoft can (because
of its own impressive scale in various markets) and does take advantage of accessible
data to benefit indirectly from Google’s own prowess in search is a testament to the
irrelevance of these unfortunately-pervasive scale and network effect arguments.
147

Wright, supra note 132.
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Importantly, Google is not the only search engine in which Edelman and Lockwood
find bias: “Evidence that other search engines with much smaller market shares . . .
exhibit similar bias would suggest to most economists that the practice certainly has
some efficiency justifications.”148 Tying doctrine has been criticized for allowing
successful challenges to business activities that are themselves forms of competition,
without evidence that they are causing competitive harm.149 Here, it is not clear that
any competitive harm will actually arise from the type of search bias that search
neutrality advocates accuse Google of engaging in.
Justice O’Connor’s extra steps of analysis prove useful in considering this
possibility. She proposes a tying analysis that begins with the steps of the quasi-per
se rule, but then considers the likely effects of the tie and any pro-competitive
effects. Application of this extra analytical step demonstrates that search neutrality
is not a major competitive concern and that regulation of search is unfounded as a
method to promote competition. The first question posed in O’Connor’s additional
analysis is whether the non-neutral action by the platform owner (here the alleged
favoring of some search results over others) is likely either to force some
competitors out of the market, making that market less competitive, or meaningfully
raise barriers to entering the searched market. The answer to this question is no.
Though Google and other popular search engines have the potential to harm an
individual website or Internet-based business, and may even force them out of
business, this does not mean that they have the potential to make the market itself
less competitive. By manipulating the position of third parties within search results,
some sites will end up winners and others losers, but this cannot make the market
overall less competitive—it simply tinkers with who the top competitors are. Under
any search method, whether completely content neutral or a full payola system, there
will be winners and losers. The losers, websites that are more difficult to find via
search engines, may be more likely to go out of business. Making one site more
likely to be in that position rather than another is not inherently anticompetitive.150
Such a practice is unlikely to harm consumers unless it demotes consumers’ desired
search results in a way that makes them less accessible and promotes less-desired
results, but this would ultimately make the search engine less useful to the user. If
search engines are tinkering with search results, and even accepting payments for
secret search promotion, it is possible that they are promoting one search result over
another for which consumers’ preferences are roughly the same. This does not make
the market less competitive, it only creates shifts in who the competitors are—a
question to which antitrust law is ambivalent.151 If, on the other hand, a search
148

Id.

149

See, e.g., Jarosch, supra note 80, at 357-62.

150

Competition law, after all, aims to protect competition, not competitors. Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). This is not a value shared by Network
Neutrality principles which at times appear aimed to protect competitors.
151
This may be a primary point on which search neutrality advocates are not willing to
accept that antitrust is a valuable field to guide neutrality inquiries. The basic unfairness of
Google selecting one website rather than another for top billing seems unfair to the loser—
especially if Google has some pecuniary interest in the winner. However, parsing the details
of how a successful firm became successful and whether their methods were fair seems a
potentially arbitrary task on which to hang neutrality based scrutiny, especially considering
that even discriminatory promotion of some competitors over others may have pro-
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engine has some profit motive to promote less useful results, the search engine itself
will become less useful. Because of low switching costs and the ease with which
consumers may experiment with different search engines, even a dominant search
engine is not likely to be able to tinker with results in this way for long without
beginning to lose share to competitors.152
Search bias is unlikely to reduce the number of competitors in searched markets,
but the question remains whether it may meaningfully raise the price of entry into
the searched markets. For some such markets, search engines may be the primary
method for connecting with consumers. If firms must expend resources to get access
to that platform, these expenditures seem wasteful—a fee that competitors must pay
just to get access to the Internet. This neutrality-based argument is anomalous to the
Internet. In no other context are resources that firms choose to expend to reach
customers wasteful. Print advertising cannot reasonably be seen as a violation of
newspaper neutrality, though in the past that platform has been as important (or more
important) to gaining access to customers as the Internet is today. The question is
not whether search engine practices erect barriers to entry that are higher than they
would be given a costless membrane that perfectly connected web surfers with the
ideal site for their desires, but whether a search engine’s discriminatory placement of
its own or another’s services raises barriers to entry compared to a world without
that search engine. For Google, the answer is unambiguously no. Compared to any
current alternative, Google provides a cheap and efficient way for competitors in the
map, e-mail, or online-shoe-shopping markets to connect with their customers. Even
if allegations that its search algorithm violates neutrality principles are true, this does
not provide evidence of consumer harm or a justification to penalize violations of
search neutrality. Given that the first step of Justice O’Connor’s analysis suggests
that the behavior targeted by search neutrality advocates is benign, there is no need
to balance anticompetitive harm against pro-competitive benefits, but in individual
cases this may be important.
Ultimately, neither neutrality principles nor current antitrust rules provide a
convincing method for analyzing search neutrality. Neutrality principles would
competitive effects. See R.H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 269, 312 (1979):
What has been promoted by payola has always depended on what the public would
buy (sheet music earlier and records more recently) after they had heard the music . . .
. Although there has to be a receptivity to a type of music if it is to be successfully
promoted, without promotional activity (which includes payola), the movement
towards a new type of music would undoubtedly be slower (because the opportunity
of hearing it would be less).
152

The same analysis applies to a search engine discriminatorily promoting not third-party
products, but its own services. This would only be possible if a search engine had the
economic power to push users towards its own product (for example a map or an e-mail
service) that was inferior to other available products, without losing its share in the market for
the underlying search platform. This situation appears unlikely for several reasons. First,
discriminatory listing does not eliminate competition between the application and its
competitors—someone doing a Google search for a “map of Indianapolis” need only go to the
second search result to view a MapQuest map, rather than a Google map. It would only
require a very slight preference for MapQuest to take that step. (And in the absence of any
such preference, there is no consumer harm in making the MapQuest map one step lower than
the Google map).
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condemn almost any discrimination engaged in by search engines when
discrimination is at the heart of what search engines do. These principles provide no
justification for focusing on specific types of discrimination that search neutrality
advocates find most troubling. Antitrust’s quasi per-se rule for analyzing tying
arrangements proves little more help. It too casts a very wide net, potentially
imposing intense scrutiny on pro-compeitive practices when engaged in by firms
with market power. Justice O’Connor’s proposed reform of the quasi-per se rule
brings restraint to the rule by requiring a demonstration either that the discrimination
will decrease competition or raise barriers to entry in the market affected by the
platform’s discrimination. Application of this rule demonstrates that though it could
meet the letter of the quasi-per se rule, it would be a mistake to enshrine search
neutrality rules. This is especially true in today’s search market which is dominated
by a single firm, but allows users to easily experiment with multiple search engines
and easily switch between them. Regulating Google alone is likely to provide an
edge to its competitors, but not in any pro-competitive way. Instead, the most likely
result of search neutrality is to serve as a dead weight on the search market leader,
slowing down the growth and usefulness of the overall market.
C. API Neutrality
Search neutrality is one of the most prominent applications of the concept of
neutrality to Internet platforms, and perhaps the most likely to result in regulation,
but this potential regulation is largely limited to a single market leader in search,
Google. Another larger group of Internet platforms has recently faced the possibility
of neutrality regulation focused on a different type of activity. Websites that allow
programs, applications, users, and other websites access to their Application
Programming Interfaces (“API”) have recently faced claims that they must keep their
interfaces open and may not restrict them once they have chosen to open them. An
API is basically a method that applications and programs can use to communicate
with and draw functionality from a given website or service.153 The API for a social
media site, for example, may be entirely closed or broadly open. A closed API
means that a website is fully self-encapsulated—users can only interact with the site
directly, or through applications that are within the direct control of the site owner.
Sites with more open API allow users to interact with the website using other sites or
applications created by third parties. For example, Facebook users may post
Foursquare check-ins to their Facebook walls through a number of apps154 that allow
users to make Foursquare check-ins. Foursquare itself has a fairly open API, thus
users may check-in on Foursquare and post that check-in to Facebook all while using
a single app designed by a third party.155 Both Foursquare and the app may be using
the Facebook API.

153

See generally Application programming interface, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Api (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
154

Both proprietary Foursquare apps and third-party apps are available. These apps use
API from both Foursquare and Facebook.
155
See,
e.g.,
Noah
Sloan,
AppBrain,
Check-in
Droid
2,
http://www.appbrain.com/app/check-in-droid-2/com.noahsloan.checkin.android (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011).
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Open APIs often lead to a proliferation of ways to interact with a particular
platform. For example, those using the Android operating system on a mobile
device can download several independently designed apps that allow users to interact
with the social media service Twitter. These apps may easily create new tweets or
aggregate a twitter feed with updates from a Facebook account.156 Similarly, other
social media websites can take advantage of open application programming
interfaces to make both services more useful. Websites and social media services
have discretion in how open or closed to make their API. A fully open API will
allow any programmer to make a website, program, or app that will interact with the
service. Most major social media services select some degree of openness, and
third-party applications have often made them more user friendly and have allowed a
greater range of uses for the service.157
Neutrality claims focused on API are relatively recent. In 2008, Professor
Jonathan Zittrain coined the term “API neutrality” as “a parallel debate that is not
taking place at all.”158 Since then, the API neutrality claims that have appeared look
somewhat similar to the neutrality claim considered a decade ago in the Microsoft
case. That case was largely about the degree to which the Microsoft Windows
operating system had to be open to outside developers, particular developers of web
browsers that competed with Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.159 In the API context,
there have been claims that the platforms on which programmers have built,
sometimes in competition with the platform owners themselves, must be kept open.
Instead of Windows as the platform at issue, it is platforms accessed via the Internet.
Professor Zittrain sees platform openness as a sort of legal one-way ratchet.
Once a platform has benefitted from the benefits of an open platform, it can not then
close its platform—closed systems may remain closed, but once opened, they may
not close.160
So when should we consider network neutrality-style mandates for
appliancized systems? The answer lies in that subset of appliancized
systems that seeks to gain the benefits of third-party contribution while
reserving the right to exclude it later. Those in favor of network
neutrality suggest, often implicitly, how foundational the Internet is for
the services offered over it. If downstream services cannot rely on the

156

See, e.g. TWEETDECK, www.tweetdeck.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).

157

The board gaming website www.boardgamegeek.com’s interface with Twitter is an
example that has allowed a specialty use of Twitter. There, users can record their
boardgaming activity and share that activity through Twitter, without leaving
boardgamegeek.com. See Boardgame Geek, www.boardgamegeek.com (last visited Jan. 19,
2012). This niche functionality is likely not valuable enough to Twitter that the platform
would have created it on its own, but it does provide some use to the boardgamegeek
community and may lead to wider use of both sites.
158

JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 181 (2008).

159

See generally, Op-Ed., Did the Microsoft Case Change the World, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,

2011.
160
Farrell and Weiser identify a one-way legal regime as a reason that a platform might
remain closed to outside developers when it would be more efficient to remain open—simply
because it is harder to close than it is to open. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 117.
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networks they use to provide roughly equal treatment of their bits, the
playing field for Internet activities can shift drastically.161
This argument that platform-benefitting innovation will not occur without some
guarantee that the platform will remain open to innovators would be unique as the
basis for market regulation. Seldom do businesses receive governmental guarantees
that the conditions under which they enter a market will remain. Instead, they must
negotiate such stability with their business partners, or earn longevity by providing a
service or product better than others can.162 Nor would such a mandate be obviously
a positive development. As established in Part II, it may be optimal for a platform
like Twitter to be either open or closed, and platforms usually have incentives to
follow the optimal path.163
Others have made more directed claims, arguing that a specific API must be
forced or kept open for developers. For example, some have argued that online
platforms, often social media sites, have become so important to daily interaction
that they are like utilities and thus must be regulated to ensure their neutral
availability.164 This perspective may have gained influence within a regulatory
agency. The FTC has recently engaged in an investigation focused on Twitter’s API
policy, following a recent restriction in that policy. Twitter has sought to exert
greater control over its platform.165 It has simultaneously began to increase the
amount of advertising on its site and proprietary apps, providing a rationale for the
site to want to direct users to its site and apps rather than letting them access the
service and network from third party apps.166 These efforts have resulted in a clash
with at least one firm that designs third party apps for viewing and creating tweets.
UberMedia is the owner of Twidroyd, a leading Twitter app for Android devices.167
In February, 2011, according to the Wall Street Journal, “UberMedia . . . said
Twitter shut off its access to tweets because it believed UberMedia had violated
‘several provisions of their terms of service.’”168 Some have suggested that
161

ZITTRAIN, supra note 158, at 183.

162

See GRIMMELMAN, supra note 129, at 448 (“A right to continued customer traffic would
be a legal anomaly; offline businesses enjoy no such right. Some Manhattanites who take the
free IKEA ferry to its store in Brooklyn eat at the nearby food trucks in the Red Hook Ball
Fields. The food truck owners would have no right to complain if IKEA discontinued the
ferry or moved its store.”) (footnote omitted).
163

See supra, text accompanying notes 16-17 (describing Farrell & Weiser’s ICE concept).

164
See, e.g., Danah Boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated, APOPHENIA (Mar.
15,
2010),
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/facebook-is-a-utilityutilities-get-regulated.html:

If Facebook is a utility – and I strongly believe it is – the handful of people who are
building cabins in the woods to get away from the evil utility companies are irrelevant
in light of all of the people who will suck up and deal with the utility to live in the
city. This is going to come down to regulation, whether we like it or not.
165

See Amir Efrati, Antitrust Regulator Makes Twitter Inquiries, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2011.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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UberMedia is the target of Twitter’s API constriction because Twitter views it as a
potential competitor.169 During this same time period, Twitter acquired another very
popular app for using Twitter and other social media sites in a mobile environment,
Tweetdeck. Both Twitter and UberMedia sought to purchase Tweetdeck, a contest
that Twitter ultimately won.170 UberMedia recently acknowledged that it had
received requests for information from the FTC as a part of an inquiry related to its
relationship with Twitter.171 As with the Google inquiry, it is not yet clear that
anything will come of the FTC’s seemingly more narrow Twitter inquiry, but it
raises the possibility of a widespread, coordinated, neutrality-motivated examination
of Internet platforms.
Others believe that regulatory action is not necessary. Mathew Ingram argues
that while Twitter may provide a service that is unique and valuable enough to
survive without third party developers, cutting them off will provide a boost to
Twitter’s nascent competitors.172 Thus there may be no anticompetitive effect for
regulation to address—instead, by restricting its API, Twitter could create an
opportunity for more competition in the submarket that it currently dominates.
Adam Thierer identifies a different danger in premature regulation. His argument
focuses on innovation: “If we apply API neutrality or adverse possession principles
forcibly, it sends a horrible signal to entrepreneurs that basically says their platforms
are theirs in name only and will be forcibly commoditized once they are popular
enough. That’s a horrible disincentive to future innovation and investment.”173 His
disagreement with Zittrain and other API neutrality advocates comes down to a
differing focus on the locus of innovation. Thierer would preserve the incentive to
come up with innovative new platforms by allowing platform owners traditional
property rights in the platform. Zittrain on the other hand focuses on innovation on
the edge of the platform. Thierer counters that this focus puts the very platform in
jeopardy, and most platforms are remarkably open anyways.174 This debate parallels
the debate between Professors Wu and Yoo in which Yoo argues that competition
should be fostered and protected where it is least present, not where it is already
robust.
Despite these critics’ objections, the recent FTC investigation into Twitter raises
the strong possibility of a wider focus on applying the concept of neutrality to
169

See id. This theory fits neatly with one of the exceptions to Farrell & Weiser’s ICE. A
platform may not select the optimal level of openness if it fears that the application will
become a platform competitor. See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 16, at 109-10. However,
here, it is possible that UberMedia is not a realistic competitor in the micro-blogging platform
market, but simply for the advertising revenue that is available for services that connect users
to the service.
170

See id.; Joe Mullin, Disharmony in Twitter-Land? FTC Has Questions for Company’s
Developers, PAIDCONTENT (July 1, 2011, 2:34 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419disharmony-in-twitter-land-ftc-has-questions-for-companys-developers/.
171

Id.

172

Id.
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Adam Thierer, A Vision of (Regulatory) Things to Come for Twitter?, TECHNOLOGY
LIBERATION FRONT (Mar. 13, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/03/13/a-vision-ofregulatory-things-to-come-for-twitter/ (emphasis omitted).
174

Id.
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Internet platforms. Such a movement, spread across many Internet-based markets
and services, could promote or stunt the growth and usefulness of the Internet for
years to come. It is important that any such widespread scrutiny proceed under a
rational framework, one that identifies non-neutral behaviors that are actually
harmful and allows those that are innovative or pro-competitive to proceed.
Unfortunately, in API neutrality, as in search neutrality discussed above, neither of
the two likely candidates for analyzing neutrality violations does a good job of
identifying harmful methods of competition.
1. Neutrality Principles Applied to API
Principles drawn from the network neutrality context, especially the FCC’s
Network Neutrality order, are unlikely to be helpful in analyzing API neutrality
claims. They provide little guidance in distinguishing between API that is
sufficiently open or excessively closed. Transparency is not the major problem that
proponents of API neutrality seek to address. Transparency issues may arise, but
they tend to be short lived. For example, when Twitter blocked apps by the
developer UberMedia, the developer quickly brought its apps into line with Twitter’s
existing policies, and acknowledged that the company had already been in
negotiations with Twitter to ensure continued access to Twitter’s API and to bring
UberMedia apps within Twitter’s API policy.175 Most major platforms offering
outside developers API access have published policies on what developers may
do.176 When there are conflicts or misunderstandings over these policies, the conflict
is transparent—the developer knows that their product has been blocked. Not only
do conflicts quickly become transparent, but they are robustly discussed in the
blogosphere making competition between platform owners for developers possible.
The no blocking and no unreasonable discrimination principles would also be
difficult to apply to API. No blocking would require a sea change, either forcing all
Internet-based platforms to close to third party developers, or forcing platforms to
choose between an entirely-open or entirely-closed model. As Farrell and Weiser’s
ICE demonstrates, forcing all platforms open to third party developers would not be
wise. In some instances, the most efficient and productive path is for the platform
owner to control all platform applications, for example, when third-party developers
might offer a lower quality product that would harm the reputation of the platform,
or when security of the platform is more important to users than a diversity of
applications.177
In order to apply the non-discrimination rules in any rational way, it would be
necessary to identify some method to distinguish between reasonable and
unreasonable discrimination. There will always be some potential third-party
application that will be foreclosed by any specific API policy—the challenge is to
175

See Ingram, supra note 112.
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See, e.g., Twitter, Developer Rules of the Road, TWITTER DEVELOPERS (June 1,
2011),http://dev.twitter.com/pages/api_terms; Facebook, Facebook Platform Policies,
FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS (Oct. 10, 2011), http://developers.facebook.com/policy/.
177

Zittrain has drawn one possible line between platforms that may be closed and those
that must be open. Platforms may choose to be closed, but once they open and take advantage
of third party developers’ efforts, they may not re-close. See supra, text accompanying notes
160-163.
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identify acceptable and unacceptable foreclosure. Neutrality principles provide little
guidance in that endeavor.
It might be possible to apply a non-discrimination policy, allowing platforms to
select their own preferred degree of openness to third-party developers, but requiring
that policy to be applied neutrally. Such a policy could be in line with the FCC rules
by allowing discrimination between types of uses, but not between individual
users.178 This, for example, would allow Twitter to decide to allow or not allow
third parties to design mobile apps to create tweets, but it would not permit it to
allow some app developers to proceed while blocking apps created by a potential
competitor like UberMedia.179
Most calls for API neutrality, however, do not focus on neutrality between
developers, but between developers and the platform’s own products. Such
discrimination against competing applications would clearly violate the Network
Neutrality Report and Order if applied to Internet platforms. For example, much of
the consternation over Twitter’s constriction of API openness was based on the fact
that some of the apps cut off were competitors with Twitter’s own products. The
problem for developers was not that Twitter chose to discriminate between them,
giving preference to some over others, but that it chose to restrict its API for all
developers in order to promote its own proprietary products. But Farrell and
Weiser’s ICE principle cautions against forcing a platform to allow third-party
developers to compete with its own products—which is to force platform openness.
In some situations an open platform will allow innovation and competition in the
applications market, but in others, applications may simply free-ride on an
innovative platform without providing additional value to users. According to
Farrell and Weiser, platforms will generally open and close when it is efficient for
them to do so.180 The type of balancing analysis that this distinction requires is not
promoted by neutrality principles but is typical of antitrust principles, even if the
current quasi-per se rule itself is not particularly suitable to the task.
2. Antitrust Analysis of API Neutrality Claims
Tying doctrine has somewhat more to offer a neutrality-motivated analysis of
API. The platform and tying good is the website or service to which third-party
programmers would like to connect—and may have an open or closed API. The tied
178
If the FCC’s Report and Order were applied to Internet platforms, even this policy
might run afoul of the non-discrimination principle if the fixed rather than wireless broadband
rules were applied.
179

The concept of API seems to imply some level of neutrality or openness. If a platform
decides to allow just a single third-party to develop and publish an app to interact with the
platform, that’s not really an API, it’s an outsourcing contract.
180

In the Twitter example, one of the apps that was cut off was “Twidroyd,” an app for
Android devices that competed with Twitter’s own Android app. Ingram, supra note 112. If
cutting that app off from the Twitter API were to decrease Twitter usage or make Twitter less
valuable to its users, the platform would likely allow it continued access. API neutrality
advocates argue that access is necessary for continued platform innovation, but such
innovation is in the platform’s interest as well. There may be situations where the platform
will not follow the path that will lead to greatest platform consumption. See text
accompanying note 17, supra, discussing the exceptions to ICE, but the non-discrimination
principle is ill-suited to identify such situations.
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good is either the proprietary services that are the only choice if a platform has
chosen a closed API, or the favored applications if the platform selects an API policy
that is in some way discriminatory. To the extent that the platform restricts the
developers who may use the API or the uses to which third-party applications may
be put, it ties use of the underlying platform to a specific set of applications which
may be built upon that platform. The Twitter example is illustrative. By restricting
the ways that apps may use its API, Twitter tied use of its micro-blogging service to
use of a specific set of favored apps, including (but not exclusively) its own apps.
The two-product requirement cannot be applied generally to API-neutrality
claims; in some cases the platform and the applications that connect to it will be a
single product, and in others they will be two products. If the platform never opens
its API to outside programmers and all related services are provided by the platform
owner, no demand for third-party services may develop, and the platform and its
applications will remain a single product. However, many platforms follow a pattern
of opening their API initially, then closing it later. In this way, when a platform is
attempting to gain a foothold in the market, it may use third-party developers to
rapidly expand the services available on the platform and improve its usability.181
Later, once the platform has gained a foothold in the market, it may be tempted to
restrict the use of its API in order to promote its own services and to gain more
control over its successful platform.182 Once a platform’s API has been opened to
some third-party development, if developers take advantage of that access, it is likely
that the market for applications that work with the platform is separate from the
market in which the platform itself competes. Applications built on platforms in this
way may compete with each other (for example competition between apps to view
tweets) or with applications on other platforms (for example, interactive online
games that use Facebook’s API to connect players may compete with games on other
forums). Either way, if there is any meaningful response to the platform opening its
API, that will be sufficient to meet the two-product requirement.
For the market power test, some platforms will have power while others will not.
The basic question is whether the platform can impose a tie or other onerous terms
without losing market share. In the example of Twitter, this seems doubtful. While
it is dominant among its direct competitors in micro-blogging, these are not its true
competition. Twitter competes more generally with a huge range of other services:
social networking sites; blogs; blog aggregators; news websites; and more. As
Adam Thierer notes, “[f]or me, Twitter is a partial substitute for blogging, IMs,
email, phone calls, and my RSS feed. Yes, like most others, I continue to use all
those other technologies and those technologies continue to pressure Twitter to
innovate.”183 Given a demand that reaches across several partially interchangeable
services and platforms, it appears unlikely that Twitter has the sort of economic
power that would allow it to impose an inefficient tying arrangement. But it is
possible that if the market is narrowly defined as micro-blogging, it might. In other
181

It is this scenario that Zittrain argues should lead to a sort of adverse possession rule,
forcing platforms that open to remain open. See supra, text accompanying notes 160-163.
182

Some find this pattern to be unfair, and argue for a rule that prohibits it. This Article
does not assume that this pattern is bad, but argues that it may cause harm only when the
platform has market power and that use of that market power is likely to either make the tied
market less competitive, or raise barriers to entering that market.
183

Thierer, supra note 173.
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situations, it will be clear that the platform does not have market power; in such
situations the analysis may end here.
Under the quasi-per se rule, demonstrating two products, market power, and a
substantial volume of commerce would be sufficient to invoke per se condemnation.
But given that the only platform to face an API-neutrality related investigation is
unlikely to have that power, it is worthwhile to examine the likely effects of an APIneutrality violation in greater depth. The relevant questions are whether the
platform’s use of its market power will either make the application market
meaningfully less competitive or raise barriers to entering that market. For both
questions, the likely answer is that it will not. First, if the platform has market
power but the applications market cuts across several platforms, then the tying
arrangement is unlikely to force any competitors out, making the applications market
less competitive.184 Two examples are illustrative. First, several firms design apps
that allow users to participate in several social networks from the same interface.
These apps are widely used and make it especially easy for social media users to
engage with the service via their mobile devices. If one social media site, Twitter, for
example, closed its API to some or all of these social media coordination apps, it
would risk losing users who value the coordinating app more than the single service
that Twitter offers. Others of course will switch to another third-party app, or will
use Twitter’s own app in addition to the app that was cut off. Twitter may have an
incentive to try to force all users to use its own app, but doing so may risk incurring
the same behavior from other social networks. If Facebook, Foursquare, Google+,
and other social networks all limit their interface to their own apps, then the
aggregating market will disappear, users will have to use many apps, and each
network will be used by a smaller proportion of all social media users. A similar
dynamic is at work for online games. Games are available everywhere—on social
media sites like Facebook, on specialty sites like boardgamegeek.com, on mobile
device apps, and in any number of other places. Game developers and popular
games cut across all of these platforms. A site that benefits from this market (as
Facebook does) has very little incentive to block a group of them from its API. Even
if it were to decide to do so, it would have very little impact on the competitive
conditions in the overall gaming market. In short, even if Facebook does have
market power in the social media market, it does not necessarily have that power in
the applications market which may be broader than the platform market. Of course,
in some cases, an applications market will develop that is absolutely platformspecific. This is rare. In the recent controversial example of Twitter narrowing
access to its API, the apps that were cut off were for the most part not Twitterspecific. Though there are apps and other uses of API that are specific to the
platform, these are unlikely to be the source of API-neutrality claims.185
184
By the same token, when the applications market cuts across several platforms, the
platform owner is unlikely to cut those applications off from the API. For example, if several
firms offer many competing online games, which may be played through several social
networking or gaming sites, it is unlikely that one of these platforms will cut these games off
from its API because to do so would reduce the popular content that the platform offers.
185

Harmful barriers to entry into the application market are also unlikely to result from a
platform narrowing access to it API and tying to its own or a select few applications. If the
applications market cuts across several platforms, the others may remain open. But if it is the
rare case that the applications market is specific to or dominated by a single platform, then the
decision to close it to new competitors will be an efficient one—made when the platform
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This analysis demonstrates not only that the FTC’s Twitter inquiry should likely
not result in any API-neutrality enforcement, but also that the two likely candidates
for methods of neutrality analysis are inadequate. Network neutrality principles
provide little guidance for examining API neutrality claims, and antitrust’s quasi-per
se rule would condemn actions that are unlikely to have any negative effects.
D. Online Marketplace Neutrality
Another area on which neutrality claims have recently focused is on specialized
online markets. Platform-specific marketplaces often interact with content providers
and customers in non-neutral ways. For example, Apple recently announced a
digital media subscription service available through its App Store. Through this
service, iPhone and iPad users can easily purchase subscriptions to newspapers,
magazines, and other media like music and video subscriptions.186 Within one day,
Google had announced a similar service, the One Pass.187 Though Apple’s new
service holds the potential to connect customers to content in a new, convenient, and
likely profitable way, some have balked at the terms that publishers must accept to
gain access to the platform. When Apple announced the subscription service, it
required publishers to pay a 30% fee to Apple; it required publishers of iOS Apps to
abstain from selling subscriptions directly through their apps without going through
the App Store (and paying Apple’s 30% fee); it required any digital content available
to purchase in an app to also be available for sale in iTunes; and it required any
publisher selling subscriptions through the App Store to sell those subscriptions at a
price as low or lower than digital subscriptions available anywhere else.188 These
terms funnel publishers and users into a walled garden with high fees, and away
from the previous system in which publishers had the ability to freely sell
subscriptions through their own less-controlled apps or uncontrolled websites.
Not surprisingly, publishers and neutrality advocates immediately criticized the
new terms. In particular, publishers of music streaming services claimed that their
business model was unsustainable under Apple’s rules.189 A number of magazine
owner believes that more user satisfaction can be obtained through a closed system than
through an open one. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. Though neither situation
raises significant concerns here, barring new entrants from an applications market is generally
not as concerning to neutrality advocates as forcing existing competitors out.
186
Press Release, Apple, Apple Launches Subscriptions on the App Store (Feb. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/02/15appstore.html.
187

A Simple Way for Publishers to Manage Paid Access Online, GOOGLE EUROPEAN
PUBLIC
POLICY
BLOG
(Feb.
16,
2011,
5:14
PM),
http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2011/02/ simple-way-for-publishers-to-manage.html;
see also Google One Pass, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/landing/onepass/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011).
188
Apple Launches Subscriptions on the App Store, supra note 186. Publishers may
continue to sell subscriptions through their websites and other services, they just cannot
connect users to them through iOS apps. Id. The 30% fee only applies to new customers—
publishers may sell digital subscriptions to existing subscribers (for example, subscribers to
the print version of a newspaper or magazine) through the App Store, without Apple taking a
cut. Id. In competition, Google’s One Pass charges only 10% of the subscription fee.
189
See Thomas Catan and Nathan Koppel, Regulators Eye Apple Anew, WALL ST. J., Feb.
18, 2011. This appears to be a good test of Farrell and Weiser’s ICE. If, in fact, the music
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and newspaper publishers also criticized the new terms.190 These content providers
criticized the high fees they were now required to pay to sell subscriptions on iOS
and the policies that made it difficult to circumvent those fees. But the harshest
iteration of Apple’s new policy was short-lived. It was countered immediately by a
mixture of technological innovation, competitive pressure, and the threat of
administrative action.
The Financial Times reacted to the subscription service’s terms by shifting
emphasis from its iOS app to a state-of-the-art web app that provides similar
functionality to its iOS app without requiring download of an approved app through
the App Store.191 In this way it was able to circumvent some of the new rules,
because it no longer was bound to Apple’s rules for downloadable apps.192 Apple
also immediately faced competitive pressure—the day after it announced the
subscription service, Google announced its own similar service, charging only a 10%
fee.193 Though no formal investigation was announced, Apple did face an informal
threat of antitrust enforcement by either the Department of Justice or the Federal
Trade Commission.194 Online marketplaces thus enter the list of Internet-based
platforms and services to face legitimate threats of enforcement action stemming
from neutrality concerns. As with search neutrality and API neutrality, an
examination of both antitrust and neutrality principles identifies no convincing
rationale for restricting these arrangements.
In the face of competition, innovation, criticism, and potential legal action, Apple
quickly backed down on some of its subscription service terms. Four months after
announcing its service, Apple announced that it would allow publishers to offer iOS
subscriptions at higher prices than offered elsewhere in order to cover the App
Store’s 30% fee.195 Apple also decided to allow publishers to offer read-only apps,
providing free or pre-paid content not available in the App Store.196 Apple’s
streaming model is untenable, Apple faces the choice of allowing third parties to continue
streaming, to provide competing content, or risk losing customers who want to stream music.
190

See id.

191

See The New FT App for iPad and iPhone, FINANCIAL TIMES, http://apps.ft.com/
ftwebapp/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
192
Notably the network neutrality Report and Order could bar Apple or mobile carriers
from blocking the Financial Times web page. Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, ¶
88.
193
A Simple Way for Publishers to Manage Paid Access Online, supra note 187; see also
GOOGLE ONE PASS, supra note 187.
194

Catan and Koppel, supra note 189.
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Robert Andrews, Apple Lets Subscription Providers Hike iOS Prices to Absorb its 30
Percent, PAIDCONTENT.ORG (June 9, 2011, 7:48 AM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-applelets-publishers-raise-ipad-price-to-absorb-its-30-percent/; see also Jerry Brito, Turns out
Apple’s Walled Garden Susceptible to Market Pressure and Political Pressure, TECHNOLOGY
LIBERATION FRONT (June 9, 2011). http://techliberation.com/2011/06/09/turns-out-appleswalled-garden-susceptible-to-market-pressure-and-political-pressure/.
196
Id.; see also Jason Kincaid, Apple Backpedals on App Store Subscription Rules,
TECHCRUNCH (June 9, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/06/09/apple-backpedals-on-appstore-subscription-rules/.
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revision of its policy suggests that the company does not have unlimited power to
force unattractive terms on the application creators that provide much of the content
that makes the iOS platform attractive.
Though Apple’s iTunes terms are the most notable current example of an online
marketplace facing neutrality-based claims, there are other marketplaces that may
lead to similar claims. For example, for e-book publishing, there are several major
online stores that offer both e-readers and e-books. Amazon has a relatively closed
platform—the e-books it sells can only be read on its own Kindle devices or apps,
and those devices and apps can only support the e-book format provided by
Amazon.197 Barnes and Noble, on the other hand, sells e-readers that can support ebooks from Barnes and Noble some other sources of e-books.198 These differing
policies could cause neutrality advocates to attempt to challenge a platform under
neutrality principles or antitrust laws.199
1. Neutrality-Based Analysis of Discriminating Online Market Platforms
Apple’s subscription service and its Google competitor One Pass do not have
obvious transparency problems. The terms of each are clearly laid out and they
compete on those terms.200 Following network neutrality principles, a lack of
transparency between competing marketplaces would be a problem if users did not
know before adopting the iOS platform that digital content providers face harsh
terms in making digital content available to iOS users. In this case, however, the
terms are public, and in line with Apple’s general philosophy and business strategy
of maintaining a more controlled mobile environment.
This leads directly to the other two of the FCC’s network neutrality principles—
no blocking and no unreasonable discrimination. The App Store’s subscription
service appears to run afoul of these principles which focus specially on not blocking
or discriminating against competing services. Here, the App Store wholly blocks
other iOS marketplaces that might sell digital subscriptions, including publishers’
own apps, and requires publishers to use iTunes to sell digital subscriptions or not do
so through apps at all.201 In the basic network neutrality context, this would be
nearly unthinkable (but not necessariliy harmful). If an Internet service provider
were to only give customers access to the websites that paid it for access to the
platform, the FCC would likely take immediate action for violating the no-blocking
197

See
Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Kindle,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=sv_kinc_9?ie=UTF8&nodeId=20
0127470#FAQs (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
198
See Nook Specs, BARNES & NOBLE, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/nook/compare/
index.asp?PID=38254 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
199

Currently, vigorous competition in e-readers and e-books would make such a challenge
groundless.
200
However, the App Store itself has faced some transparency-related criticism from app
designers who have had their apps rejected from the AppStore, or have had to wait longer than
average times for approval. See J. R. Raphael, Rejected! 10 iPhone Apps That Didn't Make
Apple's App Store, PCWORLD (Feb 22, 2009, 8:00 pm), http://www.pcworld.com/article/159
887/rejected_10_iphone_apps_that_didnt_make_apples_app_store.html.
201

This difficulty has been somewhat alleviated recently, since Apple has allowed
publishers to raise subscription prices to cover its 30% fee.
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rule.202 Here, it is apps that function in certain ways that are blocked. In fact, a
network neutrality complaint was filed against a small wireless network that sought
to bundle a special YouTube service with one of its mobile phone plans, without
offering this special connection to every other website on the Internet.203 This
offering was politically impossible for the regional budget network that tried to make
it.
But it is not so clear that similar actions are a problem when engaged in by
higher-level Internet platforms. For online markets like the App Store and One Pass,
the very enterprise would be impossible without the ability to support publishers
who are willing to pay the commission and block those that are not. Apple and
Google can only offer their respective subscription services because of their ability
to sell the service to publishers. Digital marketplaces would not be a plausible
business model if they could not charge fees and impose terms that allow them to
monetize the service they provide in easily connecting users and content.204 There is
a clear reason why network neutrality principles misfire when applied to online
marketplaces. Network neutrality developed in the context of low levels of
competition and high switching costs.
For online marketplaces that face
marketplace-neutrality claims, especially marketplaces for digital subscription
services, users can choose between platforms that have meaningfully different
policies regarding where and how users may get digital subscriptions. Even once a
user is locked in to the more restrictive iOS ecosystem, they may buy digital
subscriptions through the convenient App Store, or by, somewhat less conveniently,
going through the publisher’s website or some other marketplace not housed in an
iOS app. Users are only restricted from both having the most convenient option and
not paying the fee that Apple is able to command. It seems likely that the App
Store’s seemingly draconian terms allow it to offer publishers and users features, an
ease of use, and convenience that would not otherwise be possible. From this
perspective, Apple’s terms begin to look like the process of competition, rather than
a sabotage of that process. Though network neutrality principles provide a method
for identifying marketplace neutrality claims to scrutinize, online marketplaces are
different enough from broadband providers that it would unwise to transpose
network neutrality principles onto online marketplaces.

202
This is the case despite the lack of consensus that such a set-up would be harmful. Yoo,
for example, argues that networks should be allowed to experiment with such options. See
supra text accompanying notes 47-51. If network neutrality advocates are right that consumers
want nothing less than the full Internet, then the market should punish such experiments,
making a rule largely unnecessary.
203

Thomas W. Hazlett, FCC Net Neutrality Rules and Efficiency, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar.
29, 2011), http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/opeds/FCCNetNeutralityRulesandEfficiency.pdf..
204
Notably, the App Store’s subscription service also blocks some actions that publishers
might otherwise take. Publishers may not sell subscriptions through their own apps (though
they may through their own websites) and, under the initial terms, they could not offer lower
prices for digital subscriptions elsewhere, for example through the One Pass market. It is
unclear how the FCCs neutrality principles would apply to these restrictions on publishers that
provide content for the platform, if at all. Given immediate competition to the App Store’s
terms and the vigorous competition between mobile device operating systems, these terms are
unlikely to harm consumers.
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2. Antitrust Scrutiny of Online Markets’ Discriminatory Terms
Online markets that restrict sellers’ abilities to sell elsewhere or put other
burdensome terms on marketplace participation are not the prototypical example of a
tying arrangement. But they can still be usefully framed and analyzed under the
quasi-per se rule. Normally, markets like iTunes compete for customers by offering
convenience, low prices, or valuable services. The App Store clearly does offer
some of these, but it also may gain customers through a tying arrangement in which
it (along with its terms and fees) is the tied good. It might seem that the tying good
is the apps and digital subscriptions that must be purchased through iTunes—but in
fact the tying good is the iOS operating system and the devices on which it must
operate. By selecting a mobile device that runs on iOS, the user accepts the tie with
the iTunes App Store, and restrictions on the apps available for iOS. It is because
this tying arrangement is in place that iPhone and iPad users who want to get a
digital subscription are limited to the content providers that work within Apple’s
terms in order to be available on the platform. iTunes is the exclusive marketplace
for the iOS, excluding competing marketplaces like the Amazon App Store that is
offered on the Android OS. Framed in this way, the tying analysis proposed above
is easily applied.
First, the two-product requirement likely is met. There are two products with
demand to purchase each separately from the other. The tying goods, the iOS and
the few devices on which it operates, compete in one market against Android,
Blackberry, Microsoft and other Smartphone and mobile devices.
Online
marketplaces for digital subscriptions operate in another market, and they compete to
sell digital subscriptions separate from competition between mobile operating
systems and devices. Even under Apple’s restrictive terms, within the iOS
ecosystem the App Store competes with other places where consumers can purchase
digital subscriptions. For example, users can buy digital subscriptions directly from
publishers on their websites, from other marketplaces, like Amazon.com (though
they may not do so through an iOS app), and, until Apple’s recent policy change,
from apps that operate on iOS. Outside of iOS, consumers purchase digital
subscriptions through several online marketplaces that compete with the App Store
to sell digital subscriptions, including the Android Market, Amazon’s App Store, and
the Kindle App (both for iOS and Android). Clearly, mobile operating systems and
devices operate in a different competitive market than online Marketplaces that sell
digital subscriptions.
In Jefferson Parish, the Court found that anesthesiological services that were tied
to use of hospital surgical services were a separate product because consumers
regularly sought to select surgical services separately from anesthesiological
services—the fact that one hospital sought to offer the two together did not change
the fact that generally there is demand to purchase them separately.205 A similar
analysis applies in the iTunes context. There is demand to select digital
marketplaces separately from operating systems—the fact that Apple sanctions only
a single App Store for iOS does not change this more general market fact. Having
determined that two products are indeed tied, a platform (iOS and iOS devices) to a
specific application (the App Store), the subsequent steps determine whether the
neutrality violations implicated by the tie warrant scrutiny.
205

Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 22-24 (1984).
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The second prong of the test looks at whether the platform owner has market
power in the platform market—does Apple have market power in the operating
system or mobile device market? The answer appears to be no. Though Apple and
its iOS does occupy a large portion of the market for mobile operating systems, it
does not have such a dominant position or unique product that it can impose onerous
terms without losing part of that market share.206 Any decrease in usefulness in the
operating system caused by requiring users to purchase some products through
iTunes is a potential decrease in the number of users who decide on iOS rather than
Android, Blackberry, or Microsoft’s mobile OS. There is evidence for this fact in
the context in which Apple’s subscription service was released. The next day
Google announced a similar competing service that had more favorable terms in
place of some of the onerous ones imposed by Apple. If either Google or Apple had
the economic power to impose onerous terms without losing customers, we would
not see this competition on marketplace terms. Nor does iOS occupy a sufficient
portion of the market to suggest such power. Android devices outsell iPhones.207 In
this case, it appears that competitive harm is unlikely and the quasi-per se rule
provides no justification for further scrutiny.208
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Scrutiny of non-neutral behavior by Internet platforms appears to be inevitable.
The FTC has launched or threatened to launch investigations into a number of
Internet platforms, and commentators have called repeatedly for scrutiny of search
neutrality, API neutrality, and online marketplace neutrality violations. This attack
on the business practices of firms that give content and structure to the Internet lacks
a coherent framework for separating harmful violations of neutrality principles from
business arrangements that are forms of competition. Section V demonstrates that
application of either of the likely methods for scrutiny of Internet platforms, a
network neutrality or antitrust framework, will result in penalization of the process
of competition on the Internet, without identifying neutrality violations that are
likely to harm to competition or innovation on the Internet. Instead of either of these
shortsighted methods, policymakers, and the FTC in particular, should shift their
focus from neutrality concerns to the prevention of identifiable economic harms that
may be the result of non-neutral platform behavior. The concept of neutrality may
still be a valuable flag, suggesting that it is necessary to look for harmful business
practices, but a violation of neutrality principles alone does not demonstrate a
206
This is the basic requirement of economic power established by tying cases. See supra
text accompanying notes 82-85; cf. Jarosch, supra note 80.
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Kevin C. Tofel, Android Sales Overtake iPhone in the U.S., GIGAOM (Aug. 2, 2010,
7:56 AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/08/02/android-sales-overtake-iphone-in-the-u-s/.
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Having found that neither the two-product nor the market-power requirements are met,
it is unnecessary to consider whether competitors could be forced out of the tied market or
barriers to entry meaningfully raised—without market power it is not possible that they could
be. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37, (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Absent [market] power
tying cannot conceivably have any adverse impact in the tied-product market, and can be only
procompetitive in the tying-product market.”). In fact, a major market actor without market
power that decides to impose onerous terms like those imposed by Apple’s subscription
service is likely to create opportunities for new entry by breeding discontent among iOS users,
and lowering their thresholds for switching to another platform.
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competitive problem. Part V demonstrates this fact by examining three platforms
that face neutrality-based challenges. Yet none of these three can be adequately
scrutinized by either neutrality or antitrust frameworks.
In evaluating neutrality concerns as applied to Internet platforms, it is important
not to lose sight of the unique characteristics of Internet platforms that make simple
application of existing rules inadequate. Internet platforms in general tend to share
several qualities, and it is these qualities that prove problematic for application of the
quasi-per se rule and neutrality principles. These qualities are covered in detail in
Part V.a, but to recap, Internet platforms are different from either the goods that
generally are included in tying arrangements or the Internet access points to which
network neutrality principles are applied. For Internet platforms, use of one platform
generally does not preclude use of another. Even when only one platform can be
used at a time, switching costs tend to be low. Further, non-neutral behavior,
especially discrimination between potential platform applications may be necessary
to an Internet platform’s business model.
In looking for economic harms related to violations of neutrality principles,
policymakers should specifically look for evidence of foreclosure and exclusion.
Foreclosure, when a firm is forced out of a market, and exclusion when barriers to
entry raise the costs of entering a market, are the specific types of competitive harm
that violations of neutrality principles may cause in some situations. These were
found to be potential, but not actual harms for each of the platforms examined above.
Search neutrality is an important principle, not because search engines should not
discriminate between potential search results. To the contrary, they must do so.
This discrimination is the basis on which they compete. Violations of search
neutrality become a problem when search engines discriminate between potential
search results in ways that make it difficult to enter the searched markets, or force
some firms out of the searched markets in ways that make these markets overall less
competitive. This exclusion and foreclosure is, of course, only possible if the
discriminatory search engine has market power. Even discrimination may not cause
the searched market to be less competitive, and evidence of such an effect should be
required before penalizing a search engine.
Similarly, for API and online-marketplace neutrality, the harm does not stem
from the discrimination itself, which may be a pro-competitive method of
competition between platforms, but from discrimination which makes a second
market less competitive due to exclusion or foreclosure. For API neutrality, this
could happen if one platform, a social media site, for example, was both dominant,
and a necessary access point to succeed in a second market, for example, a video
game market. For online markets like iTunes and Google’s One Pass, the
marketplaces have not been shown to have the power to require terms that would
exclude competitors from the digital content markets. For the most part, this is
because iTunes is a convenient way for publishers to pay to get access to customers
on iOS devices, but not a necessary one for a publisher to compete in the digital
publishing market.
This focus on exclusion and foreclosure may sound overly broad. Luckily, this
analysis need not be wide open, and may be structured by our understanding of
platform behavior. Justice O’Connor laid the groundwork for this analysis in her
attempt to reform tying doctrine. The ultimate harms that non-neutral platform
behavior may cause are exclusion and foreclosure, but courts and policymakers may
take threshold questions from the quasi-per se rule, and apply them with an eye
towards ultimate economic harms, as Justice O’Connor proposes.
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Scrutiny of platform behavior that is discriminatory towards platform
applications or users is only warranted when 1) the platform and the applications or
products making use of the platform occupy separate markets with separate
consumer demands;209 2) the platform has economic power; and 3) the platform
exclusivity or non-neutrality is likely either to force existing competitors of the
applications market out of the market, or raise the barriers to entering applications
markets generally.210 As in Justice O’Connor’s gloss on the quasi-per se rule, these
anticompetitive effects must then be balanced against any pro-competitive effects
that the arrangement may have.
For each of the Internet platforms considered above, this framework produces
more reasonable results, allowing pro-competitive business arrangements to be
separated from those that may harm competition in Internet markets. It becomes
clear that discrimination between search results is a form of competition that is only
problematic if a search engine can make search results less useful and more
profitable without losing users. Similarly, restricting API is only a problem if a
platform with market power can make an entire secondary, tied market less
competitive. In today’s world of vigorous competition between websites and
Internet services, this is unlikely. And for online marketplaces, limiting access to the
market platform can only harm consumers if the market itself is so powerful that no
successful application can go without it and must abide by whatever terms it
imposes. Additionally, the marketplace must be able to survive the absence of
applications that are forced both off the platform and out of the market by onerous
terms.
This Article has examined three Internet platforms that have faced claims that
they must be in some way more neutral. It has demonstrated that neither of the
likely ways in which agencies and courts might scrutinize this discriminatory
behavior are adequate to distinguish between competitive behavior between market
participants and anticompetitive arrangements that harm online markets. Finally, it
has proposed a method of analysis in which neutrality-based claims should be
examined for the presence of two markets in which the platform has market power in
one market and uses that power to either exclude or foreclose platform applications
from a second market. This Article has applied this method of analysis to three
Internet platforms, but there are many others that either are now, or could in the
future face claims that they violate some neutrality principle. For example, e-book
publishers, sellers, and devices all have the potential to behave in discriminatory
ways towards each other. The manner in which search engines interact with social
media sites could also be the subject of neutrality scrutiny. Recently, Facebook has
made data from its social network available to power the results of a single search
engine, Bing, but has refused to grant the same access to Google or other search
competitors.211 This Article proposes a method that is sufficiently general to be
applied to such neutrality claims, as well as others that have not yet occurred.

209

Here I adopt the Court’s standard, rather than Justice O’Connor’s stricter standard that
would make application to Internet platforms difficult, if not impossible.
210

Such entry barriers must extend beyond the closed platform, and must raise barriers to
entering an applications market or markets that cut across platforms.
211
See David Balto, Google’s Integration of Social Content in Search is a Good
Development for Consumers, ANTITRUST CONNECT (Jan. 12, 2012),
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